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T
he arrival of more than one million asylum 
seekers in Europe in 2015 exposed serious flaws 
in the EU’s asylum system. While the inflow 
of irregular migrants has long subsided, the political 
landscape and public debate in Europe have been fun-
damentally and permanently altered. Multiple efforts 
over the years to reform the European asylum system 
and to make it resilient to possible future surges in ref-
ugee movements have reached an impasse. 
Since early 2016, the EU has implemented far-reach-
ing agreements with neighboring countries to curb 
irregular immigration, including the EU-Turkey un-
derstanding, the closure of the Western Balkans mi-
gration route, and support for search and rescue op-
erations by the Libyan coast guard and the return to 
Libya of individuals rescued at sea. However, the EU 
and its member states have not used the respite offered 
by fewer irregular migrants arriving in Europe to ad-
dress important shortcomings: key provisions of the 
EU-Turkey agreement are not functional, especially 
for the return of migrants from the Greek islands to 
Turkey; asylum systems in Western Balkan coun-
tries are underdeveloped and would be overwhelmed 
quickly if migrant flows were to resurge; and the hu-
man rights of migrants in Libya are routinely violated. 
In 2016—just after the peak of the so-called migra-
tion crisis—the Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and 
Migration (MEDAM) was established to pursue two 
objectives: first, to improve our understanding of the 
interrelated challenges facing the EU and its member 
states in the areas of asylum, migration, and mobility; 
and second, to engage European policy makers and 
civil society in a broad and open debate about compre-
hensive, implementable solutions to these challenges.
Since then, MEDAM researchers have analyzed im-
portant features of the European migration system 
and mapped out their mutual interdependencies— 
including the drivers of migration in countries of ori-
gin, the decision making of migrants, popular atti-
tudes towards immigration and immigration policies, 
EU and member states policies for asylum and regular 
immigration, and the living conditions and prospects 
of immigrants in countries of destination. Drawing 
on our own research as well as the existing body of 
literature, we have explored the resulting opportuni-
ties, challenges, and trade-offs and have embarked on 
a dialogue with stakeholders at EU and member state 
level on options for more effective internal and exter-
nal policies.
A recurring theme in our research is that migra-
tion must be managed if it is to deliver benefits for 
migrants, countries of origin, and countries of desti-
nation. Furthermore, to manage migration to Europe 
effectively and share responsibility equitably for re- 
fugee protection, the EU and its member states must 
cooperate on equal terms with migrants’ countries of 
origin and transit. 
The new European Commission has an opportunity 
to start afresh to address the persistent challenges in 
asylum and immigration policies. We explain in this 
report how allowing EU member states greater flexi-
bility in how they contribute to the common asylum 
system may be one way forward. Furthermore, non-EU 
countries of origin and transit have an overwhelming 
interest in expanding opportunities for their citizens 
to work in Europe legally. Cooperation in other areas, 
including containing irregular migration, would likely 
benefit from EU member states permitting more legal 
labor migration from non-EU countries.
As the first phase of MEDAM draws to a close, we 
thank Stiftung Mercator for making our work possi-
ble. We highly appreciate their continuing trust and 
support as we embark on the second phase of MEDAM 
(2020 to 2022) where we will focus on migration from 
Africa to Europe and on a more nuanced understan- 
ding of voter preferences regarding migration-related 
policies. 
We hope that this 2019 MEDAM Assessment Report 
will stimulate and inform the crucial debate on how to 
protect refugees effectively and harness labor migra-
tion to benefit migrants, host societies, and countries 
of origin. 
Preface
2019 MEDAM Assessment Report
8
on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
9
Mikkel Barslund is a research fellow and head of the 
Ageing Societies Programme at the Centre for Euro-
pean Policy Studies (CEPS), a leading think tank in 
Brussels. He is responsible for a range of projects on 
the economics of ageing societies, migration, and la-
bor mobility at CEPS. Within the MEDAM project, 
Mikkel is leading CEPS’ work on EU asylum and mi-
gration policy and has contributed to work on asylum 
and legal migration pathways, the situation in the 
Mediterranean and integration of refugees. Prior to 
joining CEPS, he worked as a senior economist at the 
Danish Economic Councils and as a Research Fellow 
at KU Leuven. Besides his policy research, he manages 
the European Network of Economic Policy Research 
Institutes and is the CEPS editor of Intereconomics.
Matthias Lücke is a senior researcher at the Kiel In-
stitute for the World Economy, an adjunct professor 
at Kiel University, and a former senior economist at 
the International Monetary Fund. In his research and 
teaching, he focuses on migration, development, in-
ternational trade policy, and European integration. 
Matthias coordinates the MEDAM project, guiding 
the development of MEDAM’s research agenda and 
leading the project’s outreach to stakeholders.  He has 
consulted widely for national governments and inter-
national organizations.
Martin Ruhs is Chair in Migration Studies and 
Deputy Director of the Migration Policy Centre 
(MPC) at the European University Institute (EUI) 
in Florence. He is on long-term leave from the Uni-
versity of Oxford. Martin’s research focuses on the 
economics and politics of international migration, 
with a strong international comparative dimension. 
In his role as one of the MEDAM’s academic co- 
directors, he is currently working on key questions 
and dilemmas in public policy making, and the 
public opinion on asylum and migration policies 
in particular. Martin has provided policy analysis 
and advice for various national governments and 
international institutions, published extensively in 
his field, and has written for the New York Times, 
Financial Times, Guardian and Irish Times. 
About the Authors
2019 MEDAM Assessment Report
10
on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
11
T
he new European Commission will inherit an 
impasse in efforts to reform the European asy-
lum system as well as concerns about practices 
in the management of the EU’s external border that 
contradict humanitarian standards and may even 
be illegal. While the number of asylum seekers who 
 manage to reach EU territory is now lower than in pre-
vious years, it may be low precisely because of those 
problematic practices, including abuse of irregular 
 migrants along the Western Balkan route, limited 
search and rescue capacity in the Central Mediter-
ranean, and EU cooperation with the Libyan coast 
guard even though migrants returned by it to Libya 
have been abused. 
In this 2019 MEDAM Assessment Report, we pres-
ent insights from MEDAM research and policy dia-
logue since 2016 to explain how closer cooperation 
among EU member states and with countries of origin 
and transit can improve outcomes for all stakehold-
ers. Crucially, short of establishing a new Iron Curtain 
on the EU’s external border or continuing to tolerate 
abuses, there is no way that either individual member 
states or the EU as a whole can insulate themselves 
from irregular migrants and asylum seekers. Yet, if 
crossing the EU border enabled all irregular migrants 
to remain in the EU for good, the integrity of EU visa 
and asylum policies would be undermined. 
Thus, close cooperation with countries of origin for 
the return and readmission of their citizens who have 
no right to remain in the EU is crucial. Still, it is typi-
cally not in the interest of countries of origin to limit 
the mobility of their citizens. Cooperation between 
the EU and countries of origin must therefore cover a 
wide enough range of policies to ensure that all parties 
consistently benefit from the policy package and have 
a strong incentive to meet their commitments. We 
emphasize more EU support for refugees hosted by 
low- and middle-income countries and more legal em-
ployment opportunities for non-EU citizens in the EU. 
Rethinking EU asylum and migration policies along 
these lines requires extensive consultations and nego-
tiations among stakeholders in Europe and in coun-
tries of origin and transit. Our ‘insights’ are meant to 
inform and stimulate such conversations. However, 
sustainable reforms will come only as the result of 
stakeholders working out the details and developing a 
sense of ownership of the necessary reforms. 
Our first set of insights relates to popular attitudes 
toward immigration and the structure of public pref-
erences for asylum and refugee protection policies 
(section 2 of this report). Next, we explain how the 
EU and countries of origin and transit can all bene-
fit from cooperating on border management, refugee 
protection, and expanding legal labor migration to the 
EU (section 3). Finally, we consider the implications 
for cooperation among EU member states and the 
long-standing plans for reform of the European asy-
lum system (section 4). 
What do the people want? Attitudes and 
policy preferences (section 2)
  Insight #1: Attitudes to immigration have re-
mained fairly stable across most European coun-
tries, but the perceived importance of migration as 
a public policy issue has increased.
  Insight #2: Attitudes to immigration tend to be 
more positive in local areas with greater shares of 
migrants. However, this relationship is influenced 
by the socioeconomic context: as the socioeconomic 
conditions of local areas worsen (e.g., with higher 
unemployment rates and lower incomes per capita), 
the positive effects of the share of migrants on at-
titudes become smaller and they eventually disap-
pear in the most deprived areas.
  Insight #3: Europeans are generally committed 
to policies that provide protection for asylum seek-
ers and refugees, but they express support for more 
policy controls, such as limits and conditions, in 
asylum and refugee policies. There is no evidence 
of widespread public support for highly restrictive 
policies that eliminate protection and assistance.
A key implication of these insights is that, contrary 
to the impression created in public debates in many 
European countries, it is possible to garner public 
support for asylum and refugee policies that provide 
protection and assistance. To achieve this, policy mak-
ers need to think carefully about policy design (e.g., 
when and how to use policy limits and conditions, and 
how to distribute refugees across geographical areas) 
and about how to communicate their policy ideas and 
objectives to the public. The design of policy needs 
to take into account what we know about the likely 
responses from the resident population to various 
different policy options. The communication of pub-
lic policies needs to relate to the reasons behind the 
increasing salience of immigration as a policy issue, 
including concerns about a perceived lack of state con-
trol over immigration. 
Executive summary
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Cooperation with countries of origin and 
transit on border and migration manage­
ment, as well as legal labor migration 
(section 3)
  Insight #4: Limiting irregular immigration into 
the EU while safeguarding refugees’ access to pro-
tection (either in Europe or in regions of origin) re-
quires close cooperation not only among EU mem-
ber states, but also with countries of origin and 
transit. Yet, countries of origin, transit, and desti-
nation may have diverging interests with respect to 
border and migration management. Therefore, co-
operation needs to cover a sufficiently wide range of 
policy areas so that all parties can be sure to benefit, 
and the underlying agreements become politically 
sustainable and self-enforcing.
  Insight #5: If the EU wants to enforce its visa pol-
icy and control the inflow of non-EU nationals into 
the EU, it needs to work with neighboring coun-
tries toward limiting access to EU territory to those 
non-EU citizens who have valid travel documents. 
Otherwise, particularly if there are no restrictions 
on irregular travel along the informal Mediterra-
nean migration routes and on subsequent entry 
into the EU, large numbers of asylum seekers might 
overwhelm reception capacity in EU member states. 
Still, given the ongoing abuses at the EU’s external 
border, it must be emphasized that border and mi-
gration management must be in line with humani-
tarian standards and migrants’ rights.
  Insight #6: Low- and middle-income countries 
host most of the world’s refugees. As a matter of hu-
manitarian principle and to discourage secondary 
migration to the EU, the EU should share actively 
in the responsibility for protecting these refugees 
through adequate long-term financial and technical 
support and by working with host countries to facil-
itate the refugees’ economic and social integration.
  Insight #7: Whatever the level of external finan-
cial support, small host countries may simply be 
overburdened by a large number of refugees. In 
such cases, the EU should participate actively in re-
settlement schemes for vulnerable refugees.
  Insight #8: The integrity of the EU asylum system 
depends on effective procedures for the return and 
readmission by their countries of origin of non-EU 
citizens who have no right to remain in the EU. Yet, 
many countries of origin find it politically difficult 
to support the involuntary return of their citizens. 
Despite many agreements on the books, cooper-
ation on return and readmission is often less than 
smooth in practice. The EU should explore with 
countries of origin how additional legal migration 
opportunities, skill partnerships, study visas, etc., 
can make support for involuntary returns politi-
cally sustainable in countries of origin and provide 
a viable alternative to individuals who might other-
wise contemplate irregular migration.
  Insight #9: Contrary to earlier studies, our empir-
ical research indicates that income growth in low- 
and middle-income countries of origin tends to 
reduce emigration, as does development assistance 
for better public services and social infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, the reductions in emigration due to 
higher income or development assistance are too 
small to render development cooperation an effec-
tive tool to manage emigration.
Thus, the new European Commission faces the key 
challenge of making a fresh start in its cooperation 
with countries of origin and transit, with a focus on 
listening to stakeholders and taking their interests 
on board. This is the first step towards negotiating 
self-enforcing agreements with partner country gov-
ernments that lead to effective return and readmission 
of non-EU citizens, which remains a precondition for 
effective and humane management of the EU’s exter-
nal border. 
EU and member state policies and 
 cooperation (section 4)
  Insight #10: The start of the new European Com-
mission’s mandate provides an opportunity to re-
consider the approach taken towards the reform 
of the Common European Asylum System. The 
current package approach—whereby agreement 
is sought on all legislative files simultaneously—
means that the contentious proposal for reforming 
the Dublin Regulation is blocking any further pro-
gress. Pursuing a file-by-file approach and moving 
forward on those individual legislative proposals 
where there is broad agreement among member 
states can break the present deadlock. 
  Insight #11: Only a few small EU member states 
are currently overburdened by a disproportionately 
high number of asylum applications (mainly Cy-
prus, Malta, and Greece). Given continuing disa-
greement over the feasibility and extent of a manda-
tory relocation scheme for asylum seekers, it should 
now be a priority to establish working procedures 
for a coalition of willing countries to relocate asy-
lum seekers rescued in the Central Mediterranean. 
Such procedures would go a long way to relieve the 
few countries that are truly overburdened.
  Insight #12: Negotiations on the EU’s 2021-2027 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) offer an 
important window for strengthening financial sol-
on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
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idarity among member states with respect to asy-
lum and immigration. A dedicated budget line that 
compensates member states for each asylum seeker 
received (possibly above a threshold) would be one 
effective tool to ensure more solidarity. The same 
mechanism could be used to support the voluntary 
relocation of refugees among member states. 
  Insight #13: The next MFF should also increase 
support for other important elements of European 
migration and asylum policies. The EU Asylum 
and Border and Coast Guard Agencies should be 
put in a position to provide additional assistance to 
member states as needed. Likewise, the EU budget 
should support programs aiding resettlement from 
third countries (insight #7), humanitarian visas 
(when warranted), and labor migration schemes 
(insight #8). Additional funding for refugees hosted 
by non-EU countries is also warranted on humani-
tarian grounds and to discourage secondary migra-
tion to Europe (insight #6).
  Insight #14: To move the EU’s asylum and mi-
gration policy forward towards more solidarity 
among EU member states and with non-EU coun-
tries that host refugees, we recommend that the new 
Commission establish a monitoring mechanism (or 
scoreboard) to collect information on each member 
state’s exposure and contribution to all elements of 
asylum and migration policy (irrespective of area 
of competence). The scoreboard would support an-
nual discussions on voluntary relocation and other 
instruments of solidarity. 
In sum, efforts to reform the EU asylum system have 
been deadlocked since 2016. The new Commission 
can start afresh by adopting a new approach to asylum 
and migration policy that emphasizes the common 
interest of EU member states in managing the EU’s 
external border effectively and humanely and helping 
to protect refugees world-wide as signatory states of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. At the same time, this 
approach would allow member states to contribute to 
the common tasks in line with their capacities: Finan-
cial contributions would go through the EU budget 
and member state shares would be the same as for the 
overall budget. More flexibility would be allowed par-
ticularly in the hosting of asylum seekers, recognized 
refugees, or refugees resettled by UNHCR. 
The proposed monitoring mechanism would en-
courage transparency and constructive debate among 
member states on how responsibility for implementing 
EU asylum and migration policies should be shared 
fairly; how member states should contribute to closer 
cooperation with countries of origin and transit, in-
cluding by expanding opportunities for legal labor 
 migration; and how member states should contribute 
to refugee protection worldwide through humani-
tarian and development cooperation and by hosting 
refugees resettled by UNHCR. Well-designed and 
 carefully coordinated actions are required in these di-
verse policy fields to overcome the current deficiencies 
in the management of the EU’s external border and 
build the capacity of the EU asylum system, both at 
the EU and member state levels, so that the EU can 
respond  adequately to future refugee situations as they 
may arise. 
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T
he new European Commission, like its prede-
cessor, faces interrelated challenges in the areas 
of border management, irregular immigration 
to the EU, and asylum policy—all set within the larg-
er context of EU relations with migrants’ countries of 
origin in the European neighborhood and beyond. 
Although far fewer irregular immigrants are entering 
EU territory now than in 2015, this is in part the result 
of EU policies and practices in border management 
that may not be sustainable without significant addi-
tional effort (e.g., the EU-Turkey agreement) or may 
even be incompatible with humanitarian standards 
(e.g., the treatment of irregular migrants at some na-
tional borders in the Western Balkans). 
Hence, the challenge remains of designing policies 
for border management and asylum that align with 
humanitarian principles, enjoy the support of Euro-
pean voters, and lead to a fair sharing of responsibility 
for refugee protection among EU member states and 
with host countries in the rest of the world. In this 
2019 MEDAM Assessment Report, we identify and 
discuss key insights from our research and dialogue 
with stakeholders since 2016 to inform the design of 
policies under the new Commission. We emphasize 
the interdependence of policies in areas as seemingly 
separate as border management and refugee integra-
tion in low- and middle-income countries. Above all, 
we explain how cooperation with migrants’ countries 
of origin and transit in different policy areas is key to 
effective and humane policies on asylum and immi-
gration and on border management. 
A process of rethinking asylum and migration 
policies in Europe must begin with conversations 
on a wide range of migration-related policies among 
stakeholders in Europe and, equally, in countries of 
origin and transit, especially in the European neigh-
borhood and in Africa. The European Commission 
plays a key role in the design of many relevant pol-
icies and is therefore well placed to advance the de-
bate. The insights that we present in this Assessment 
Report demonstrate how the current impasse in EU 
asylum and migration policies can be overcome and 
how politically sustainable, humane, and effective 
policies can be developed. In this process, while our 
‘insights’ suggest directions, actual policies will be 
shaped by conversations and negotiations among 
stakeholders.
In this Assessment Report, we address three broad 
topics. First, what asylum and refugee policies do Eu-
ropean voters want? Specifically, does the rise of right-
wing, anti-asylum, anti-immigration parties in several 
EU countries indicate a broad shift by the EU popula-
tion toward more skeptical attitudes on immigration 
and asylum? We paint a more nuanced picture that 
indicates a broad popular desire for state authorities to 
be able to control borders and the inflow of migrants, 
but also support for carefully regulated refugee protec-
tion (section 2). 
Second, we discuss how control over the external 
EU border and immigration can only be exercised in 
close cooperation with countries of origin and transit 
(section 3). At the same time, it is often not in the eco-
nomic or political interest of countries of origin and 
transit to help the EU restrict irregular migration—
neither at the economy-wide and nor at the individual 
level. In the absence of legal migration opportunities, 
irregular migration may be better than no migration 
at all for migrants, the recipients of their remittances, 
and countries of origin. To address this conundrum, 
we discuss possible elements of a comprehensive ap-
proach to cooperation, which would extend not only 
to border management and the return and readmis-
sion of non-EU citizens who have no right to remain 
in Europe, but also to support for refugees in low- and 
middle-income countries, development assistance, 
and legal employment opportunities in the EU. We 
emphasize that effective cooperation must start by 
listening to the concerns of stakeholders in countries 
of origin and transit, and then jointly developing pol-
icy packages that benefit all parties and are therefore 
‘self-enforcing.’
Third, attempts to impose cooperation among EU 
member states on asylum and other migration-related 
policies by majority vote have failed in the past and, 
in our view, are unlikely to succeed in the future. Yet, 
refugee protection is in important ways a public good 
at the EU level and requires coordinated actions by the 
Commission and member states to be effective. We 
discuss how the new European Commission can make 
a fresh start on the long-standing legislative reforms of 
the European asylum system; how common actions in 
asylum and migration policy should be costed in the 
2021–27 Multiannual Financial Framework; and how 
a monitoring system for member states’ contributions 
to asylum policy can help to combine the necessary 
flexibility for member states regarding their contri-
butions with the fundamental need for responsibility 
sharing and solidarity (section 4). 
1 Introduction
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A key goal of MEDAM is to identify the oppor-tunities for, and obstacles to more effective and sustainable common EU policy making in the 
area of asylum and migration. We argue that a better 
understanding of Europeans’ public attitudes to im-
migration and asylum policies—how they vary across 
individuals and countries, how they have changed over 
time, and their causes and consequences—is of critical 
importance to promoting more cooperative and effec-
tive policy approaches among EU member states. 
There are at least three interrelated reasons why it 
is important, from a policy perspective, to study pub-
lic attitudes to migrants and public policy preferences 
vis-à-vis asylum and migration policies. First, public 
attitudes and policy preferences can—and often do—
play an important role in the politics of migration, 
and in public policy making more generally. We know 
from existing research that migration and other pub-
lic policies are not only determined by ‘interests’ (such 
as the economic interests of employers) and ‘institu-
tions’ (such as national parliamentary systems and 
welfare states), but also by ‘ideas,’ including people’s 
fundamental normative beliefs, values, and public atti-
tudes. Understanding public attitudes is thus essential 
to help both explain current and past migration poli-
cies, and identify realistic opportunities for achieving 
more cooperative policies on migration across mem-
ber states within the EU, and also between the EU and 
other countries. 
A second and related reason stems from the political 
legitimacy and sustainability of public policies in lib-
eral democracies. There can be many legal and moral 
reasons—such as the requirements of existing interna-
tional laws or a perceived moral duty to offer protec-
tion to people in need—why public policies should not 
always follow public attitudes. It is also clear, however, 
that sustainable asylum and migration policies require 
at least a degree of public support. Misunderstanding 
the characteristics and causes of the public’s support 
or opposition to different types of migration and mi-
gration policies, especially of their (alleged or real) 
changes over time, can contribute to policy responses 
that do not actually deal with the real issues driving 
public views and that, therefore, may ultimately prove 
unsustainable. 
Many of the asylum and migration policy changes 
proposed or made in EU member states in recent years 
have been explicitly based on the argument that these 
new policies are needed because ‘the public wants 
them’ and ‘they are necessary to win back public trust 
and confidence’ in national governments. For example, 
the Austrian-Danish vision paper published in 2018 
proposed to reduce radically opportunities to apply 
for asylum in Europe in order to restore public trust 
in government.1 It is an important task for research to 
scrutinize these arguments made by politicians in dif-
ferent EU member states, and to provide greater clarity 
on what the available data on public attitudes do and 
do not say about public concerns related to migrants 
and refugees. 
One specific issue that remains poorly understood, 
but which is particularly important for policy debates 
and policy making, is what people think about asylum 
and migration policies. All asylum and migration pol-
icies are multidimensional in the sense that they re-
quire multiple policy decisions, on different aspects of 
the overall policy package, at the same time. For exam-
ple, asylum and refugee policies are not only about ad-
mitting ‘fewer or more refugees’ but also about other 
matters: 
• how to regulate the assessment of asylum applica-
tions; 
• what employment and welfare rights to grant to asy-
lum seekers and recognized refugees; 
• what to do with people whose applications for asy-
lum are refused; 
• whether and how to help first countries of asylum 
near conflict zones; 
• the admission of refugees who are resettled directly 
from conflict zones; and 
• the role of the EU in all these processes and deci-
sions. 
Most existing research focuses on public attitudes 
to migration rather than migration policies. As a con-
sequence, we know very little about people’s attitudes 
to the various different components of asylum and 
migration policies, which policy aspects generate the 
most support or opposition, or about how they would 
2 Public attitudes to 
 immigration and asylum policy 
preferences in the EU Lead Author: Martin Ruhs
1 See Austrian Ministry of the Interior and Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration, “Vision for a Better Protection System in a Globalized World,” Vienna and 
Copenhagen, October 2018, http://uim.dk/filer/nyheder2018/vision-for-a-better-protection-system-in-a-globalized-world.pdf. 
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view trade-offs and prioritize between competing pol-
icy objectives. 
A third reason why a better understanding of public 
attitudes and policy preferences is critical to improved 
policy making relates to the challenge of designing sus-
tainable common migration policy approaches across 
the EU. Almost five years after the large inflows of asy-
lum seekers and other migrants during the  so-called 
refugee crisis in 2015–16, member states  remain deeply 
divided about how to reform and rebuild Europe’s asy-
lum, refugee, and migration policies. Some member 
states see the solution to the immigration challenge as 
lying in ‘more Europe’ (e.g., through centralization of 
the EU asylum system) and ‘greater solidarity’ among 
member states (e.g., through redistribution of refugees 
across countries). Other member states appear to have 
given up waiting on EU policy reform and instead 
pursued national or transnational policy responses, 
involving just a few ‘like-minded’ EU member states 
(e.g., joint measures by Austria and nine Balkan states 
in 2016 to help ‘close down’ the Western Balkan route, 
and proposals by Austria and Denmark to limit se-
verely the right to apply for asylum in Europe). This 
has further deepened divisions and raised profound 
questions not only about the meaning of ‘solidarity’ 
in Europe but also about the future of the EU and its 
ability to find common ground on a fundamental and, 
some would argue, existential policy challenge.
To find an effective and sustainable new EU policy 
approach to asylum and migration we need to un-
derstand how and why public attitudes to migration 
and migration policies differ across individuals and 
countries, and what role these differences play in 
the politics of migration across EU member states. 
Cross-country differences in attitudes that are due to 
underlying structural factors that cannot be changed 
in the short run can have notable implications for how 
to design common EU policies on asylum and migra-
tion.  Arguably, policy debates in recent years have 
not paid enough attention to these potential varia-
tions across EU member states, or the implications for 
 common policy making.
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The country's cultural life
is undermined by immigrants
Immigrants make the country 
a worse or better place to live
Immigration is bad or good 
for the country's economy
Figure 1 Average attitudes in EU member states included in all ESS waves, 2002–17
  
Source: Ademmer and Stöhr 2018a. 
Notes: The sample is restricted to those states that are EU members as of 2018 and have been surveyed in each European Social Survey (ESS) wave to prevent EU averages from being 
skewed by the accession of new member states. Averages are calculated using ESS weights to control for the probability of being sampled for the survey within an individual country and 
the population size of the country. The averages are thus representative of the population distribution within the country and the population of EU countries covered here. The answer 
scale runs from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates the most positive assessment. Some EU countries are not covered in the graphs because the question has not been continuously asked in them. 
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Immigrants make country worse or better place to live
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Figure 2 Polarization within Hungary and Germany over time
 
Source: Ademmer and Stöhr 2018a. 
Note: Respondents were asked whether immigrants make a country a better or worse place to live in. The answer 0 indicates “much worse,” 5 “neither worse nor 
better,” and 10 “much better.” Survey responses adjusted for sampling probability.
  Insight #1: Attitudes to immigration have re-
mained fairly stable across most European coun-
tries, but the perceived importance of migration as 
a public policy issue has increased. 
There is a common perception in policy debates that 
the large increase in the numbers of asylum seek-
ers and other migrants arriving in Europe during 
2015 and 2016 has led to a marked change in public 
attitudes to immigration across EU member states, 
making them more negative. This alleged change in 
public sentiments toward migrants and refugees has 
frequently been used to justify changes to asylum and 
refugee policies at both national and EU levels. 
There is no evidence to support the idea that Eu-
ropeans have turned against immigration in recent 
years. Attitudes have been surprisingly stable and 
turned more positive toward migrants in many EU 
countries, with few exceptions. As shown in figure 1, 
survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 
for 13 EU member states suggest that Europeans as-
sess the impact of immigration on their country and 
its economy and culture in a more positive light than 
they did in 2002—even in the aftermath of the 2015 
refugee inflow. Hungary is a prominent exception. 
Public perceptions of the impacts of immigration 
vary relatively little across these EU member states. 
On average, people are rather agnostic about the 
 overall impact of migrants on their economies and 
societies. 
While there has been no widespread turn against 
immigration, in some EU countries public attitudes 
have become more polarized. In other words, many 
people now hold stronger views about immigration 
and its impacts than they did in 2002. This is the case, 
for example, in Germany and Hungary (see figure 2). 
Another significant change in attitudes to immigra-
tion that has occurred over the past few years relates 
to the salience of immigration as a public policy issue. 
Salience is not about positive or negative views on a 
particular issue, but about the relative importance of 
the issue to respondents. Public opinion data suggest 
a rapid increase in the salience of immigration during 
2015–16 in many European countries and research 
suggests that this surge has positively affected electoral 
support for populist right parties (Dennison 2019; 
Dennison and Geddes 2018). The growing salience of 
immigration suggested by data on public attitudes is 
confirmed by MEDAM analysis of how migrants and 
refugees are discussed in social media. Social media is 
ever more used as a platform for immigration debates. 
The so-called refugee crisis dramatically multiplied 
the number of people discussing migration issues on-
line (see figure 3). 
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What are the implications of these changes for na-
tional and EU policies on asylum and refugees? First, 
although public attitudes to immigration have not 
become more negative in recent years, the increasing 
salience of the issue and the polarization of attitudes 
in many countries have compounded the policy con-
straints for policy makers. A basic but key implication 
is that, to respond effectively to changes in public atti-
tudes over the past few years, policy makers need to be 
focused on the actual changes that have taken place, 
i.e., changes in degrees of polarization and salience 
rather than in sentiments toward migrants. In par-
ticular, there is an urgent need to consider the causes 
of the increasing salience of immigration as a policy 
issue, especially among those parts of the population 
with negative views on immigration. The rising scale 
of immigration is likely to be a factor, but so is the per-
ceived loss of control over borders during 2015–16. It is 
also important to reflect critically on various processes 
of politicization of migrants and refugees in domestic 
policy debates. 
A second, related implication concerns political 
narratives and communication. Politicians who wish 
to respond to the growing salience of immigration, in-
cluding among people with negative views of migrants, 
need to use words and language that are relevant to the 
values and beliefs of people holding those views (see 
Dennison and Geddes 2018). Increases in the salience 
of immigration often coincide with periods when there 
is a perceived loss of control over immigration. Policy 
narratives need to include the language of ‘control’, 
but without suggesting that all aspects of immigra-
tion can be controlled (which would be an unrealistic 
expectation and thus constitute a counterproductive 
policy strategy). 
  Insight #2: Attitudes to immigration tend to be 
more positive in local areas with greater shares of 
migrants. However, this relationship is influenced 
by the socioeconomic context: as the socioeconomic 
conditions of local areas worsen (e.g., with higher 
unemployment rates and lower incomes per capita), 
the positive effects of the share of migrants on 
 attitudes become smaller and they eventually dis-
appear in the most deprived areas. 
How are people’s attitudes to immigration linked to 
the share of migrants in the local population of a par-
ticular area? Does an increase in the physical presence 
of migrants—on the streets, in the neighborhoods, 
at work, on the bus, at school—exert a positive or a 
negative effect on how the majoritarian populations 
perceive migrants? These are important questions not 
only for research but also for public policy debates 
about, for example, whether and how asylum seekers 
or refugees should be distributed across different local 
areas within and across EU countries. 
In theory, the impact of the presence of migrants on 
attitudes to immigration in a particular area may be 
shaped by two potentially competing forces. On the 
one hand, a higher share of migrants in the local pop-
ulation may promote greater contact with pre-existing 
residents and thus encourage mutual understand-
ing and more positive attitudes toward immigration 
(‘contact theory’). On the other hand, a higher share of 



































































































a. Facebook user comments under articles on 
 migration and asylum posted by German regional 
newspapers on Facebook 
b. Number of unique Facebook commenters under 
articles on migration and asylum posted by German 
regional newspapers on Facebook
Figure 3 Facebook comments on migration­related articles in German regional newspapers, 
2012­2017  
 
Source: Ademmer and Stöhr 2018b.
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ciated with the development of different types of fears, 
such as intensified competition for jobs and more 
pressures on public services (‘threat theory’). Given 
these potentially counteracting forces, the actual re-
lationship between the concentration of migrants and 
attitudes to immigration is a central question for em-
pirical research.
Most existing studies have found that individuals 
who reside in neighborhoods or small areas (i.e., prov-
inces or small regions) with a higher migrant concen-
tration have, in general, more positive views toward 
immigration compared with individuals who live in 
areas with a lower concentration. These findings are 
typically explained with reference to contact theory. 
Yet, with few exceptions, most of these studies have 
disregarded the complexities of the environment in 
which individuals live, including the socioeconomic 
context in which contacts with migrants occur. 
It is important to ask whether and how the socio-
economic characteristics of an area might affect the 
relationship between the share of migrants and atti-
tudes to immigration. In practice, contact and threat 
might coexist but the extent to which one of the two 
theories prevails is likely to be related to the conditions 
under which such contact or exposure occurs. While 
an increase of immigrants in poor areas does not nec-
essarily mean that attitudes toward immigration will 
worsen, poor socioeconomic conditions may discour-
age the development of positive attitudes. Conversely, 
contexts where social exchanges occur with less com-
petition for resources are more likely to enhance posi-
tive attitudes to immigration.
To shed light on these crucial questions, MEDAM 
research (Hoxhaj and Zuccotti 2019) has investigated 
whether and how the relationship between the pres-
ence of migrants and individuals’ attitudes toward 
migrants is influenced by the socioeconomic charac-
teristics of the area (as measured by local unemploy-
ment rates and income per capita). In line with the ex-
isting research literature, this new research finds that 
individuals who reside in areas with a higher share of 
migrants have, in general, a more positive attitude to-
wards them (figure 4 illustrates the positive estimated 
effect of the migrant share when unemployment is low 
or per capita income high). However, this estimated ef-
fect is conditioned by the socioeconomic context: The 
positive marginal effect of the migrant share on atti-
tudes decreases as socioeconomic conditions worsen. 
Nevertheless, even in areas where one would ex-
pect threat mechanisms to occur to the greatest ex-
tent—i.e., areas with the poorest socioeconomic con-
ditions, where competition for public services and jobs 
is probably the highest—an increase in the migrant 
share does not significantly worsen individuals’ atti-
tudes towards migrants: When the unemployment rate 
is above 12.5 percent (panel a) or log GDP per capita 
below 9.5 (€13,360; panel b), the ‘zero line’ lies within 
the boundaries of the confidence intervals around the 
estimated effects, meaning that the estimated effects 
are not statistically different from zero. 
These new research findings have implications for 
national and EU debates and for policy making on 
migration, especially related to policies that aim to 
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Figure 4 How are attitudes toward immigrants in Europe shaped by regional contexts? 
 a. b.
  
Source: Hoxhaj and Zuccotti 2019. 
Notes: This figure shows how local socio-economic factors such as unemployment (Graph 1) and GDP per capita (Graph 2) influence the relationship between the share of 
immigrants and attitudes to immigration. The negative (positive) inclination of the bold line in Graph 1 (Graph 2) indicates that the worst the socio-economic conditions of the 
NUTS 3 area, the lower the positive effect of the immigrant’s share on attitudes to immigration. The effect of socio-economic conditions is relevant mostly in better off areas 
(significance intervals presented by the dashed lines are both above the 0 line). 
ShareMig = share of migrants in the local area population.
NUTS 3: Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), are standardized geographies that are often used for the elaboration and presentation of cross-national 
 statistics in Europe The definition of NUTS3 includes areas with a size between 150.000 and 800.000 inhabitants.
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local areas within countries, or among EU countries. 
One basic but important implication is that any pol-
icy promoting the spatial (re-)distribution of refugees 
should consider the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the areas in which they will reside. MEDAM research 
suggests that placing refugees in areas with better so-
cioeconomic characteristics is more likely to promote 
migrants’ acceptance by the local population than 
placing them in poorer areas (as many countries cur-
rently do).
  Insight #3: Europeans are generally committed 
to policies that provide protection for asylum seek-
ers and refugees but they express support for more 
policy controls, such as limits and conditions, in 
asylum and refugee policies. There is no evidence 
of widespread public support for highly restrictive 
policies that eliminate protection and assistance. 
Despite the growing prominence of asylum and mi-
gration in public policy debates in Europe, we know 
surprisingly little about the types of asylum and refu-
gee policies that Europeans support or oppose. While 
there is a lot of research literature on public attitudes 
to immigration and individual immigrants in Europe 
and other high-income countries (e.g., Hainmueller 
and Hopkins 2014), there has been considerably less 
research on attitudes to asylum seekers and refugees 
(but see Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016), 
and very limited work on asylum and refugee poli-
cies (exceptions include Bansak, Hainmueller, and 
Hangartner 2017). A notable limitation of the exist-
ing studies that do deal with public preferences on 
asylum/refugee policies is that they focus on isolated 
policy questions rather than taking a comprehensive 
approach that considers the inherent multidimension-
ality of the policy issue. Consequently, we have a poor 
understanding of the policy features and changes that 
would generate the most public support or opposition 
to the overall asylum and refugee policy. 
To address this gap in existing research, and to con-
tribute to ongoing policy debates about how to reform 
national and common refugee policies in Europe, 
MEDAM researchers conducted a new study (Jeannet 
et al. 2019) that involved ‘conjoint survey experiments’ 
with 12,000 people across eight European countries, 
including Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Poland, Spain, and Sweden (1,500 online survey inter-
views with a nationally representative sample in each 
country). Conjoint experiments are particularly useful 
for studying public attitudes toward multidimensional 
(policy) issues. 
Rather than asking respondents to assess and rate 
certain policies independent of one another, conjoint 
experiments require respondents to make a series of 
constrained choices between pairs of policy options 
that differ across several ‘dimensions’ making up the 
overall policy. The methodology facilitates analysis of 
how specific policy features affect both support and 
opposition to the overall asylum and refugee policy. 
The new MEDAM study defined an asylum and ref-
ugee policy in terms of six underlying policy dimen-
sions that regulate the following aspects:
• the right to apply for asylum; 
• the resettlement of already recognized refugees to 
the EU from non-EU countries; 
• the return of asylum seekers whose applications for 
protection have been unsuccessful; 
• family reunification for recognized refugees; 
• the role of the EU in the governance of asylum and 
refugee issues; and 
• financial assistance to non-EU countries hosting 
refugees. 
Each of these six policy dimensions takes on two or 
three possible values, which are all listed in table 1 be-
low. 
The aim of the research is to establish what types 
of policy changes would generate the most public 
support or opposition. We concentrated on studying 
support and opposition to fundamental policy prin-
ciples rather than very specific policy options. So, for 
example, we asked about ‘annual limits’ to asylum ap-
plications in order to explore support for moving away 
from the current status quo (‘no limits’), not because 
we wanted to assess support for a very specific policy 
option. We used the idea of an annual limit as an ex-
ample of a control measure in this policy dimension. 
The different values in the other dimensions should 
be considered and interpreted in a similar way, e.g., 
as illustrative examples of policy changes that would 
imply a fundamental change in the underlying policy 
principles. 
The key results of the study are shown in figure 5. 
The figure shows the effects of changes within policy 
dimensions on the probability of accepting the over-
all ‘asylum and refugee policy’ relative to the reference 
category. In each policy dimension, the first value (i.e., 
the policy feature listed first) serves as the reference 
category. For example, introducing an annual limit on 
the number of asylum applications increases the prob-
ability that an individual would support the overall 
asylum and refugee policy by just over 5 percentage 
points, while not allowing any family reunification for 
recognized refugees reduces the probability of accept-
ance of the overall policy by just under 5 percentage 
points. In the context of a conjoint experiment, these 
effects are quite large. 
Figure 5 shows that, compared with the respective 
reference categories within each policy dimension, in-
troducing an annual limit on the annual applications 
for asylum, having a resource requirement for family 
reunification, and conditioning financial assistance to 
2019 MEDAM Assessment Report
22
non-EU countries hosting refugees on their efforts to 
reduce migration to Europe would increase Europe-
ans’ support for asylum and refugee policies. 
On the other hand, public support would be reduced 
by a high rate of resettlement, sometimes sending 
failed asylum seekers (whose applications for protec-
tion have been unsuccessful) back to dangerous places 
(e.g., violating the principle of non-refoulement), never 
allowing family reunification for refugees, having an 
EU agency rather than national governments assess 
and decide on applications for asylum in Europe, and 
unconditional assistance to non-EU countries hosting 
large numbers of refugees. 
While there appears to be a widespread perception 
that public attitudes to immigration and immigration 
policies differ considerably across European countries, 
the new MEDAM research finds that many of the key 
features of the public’s preferred asylum and refugee 
policies are remarkably similar across countries. The 
patterns of Europeans’ policy preferences are broadly 
similar across different countries, although there are 
cross-country differences when it comes to resettle-
ment, the role of the EU, and financial assistance to 
non-EU countries hosting refugees. For example, in 
Hungary both ‘low’ and ‘high’ rates of resettlement 
have negative impacts, while in Spain they both in-
crease acceptance of the overall asylum and refugee 
policy. Italy is the only country where having a central 
EU agency assess and decide on asylum applications 
does not decrease public support. 
Overall, this research suggests that Europeans sup-
port additional controls and conditions on various 
 aspects of asylum and refugee policies. The results 
also suggest, however, that highly restrictive meas-
ures that would imply moving away from funda-
mental principles underlying current policies, such 
as sending people back to dangerous places (non- 






Family reunification for 
recognized refugees
Decisions on asylum 
 applications 
Financial solidarity 
Table 1 Possible values (or ‘policy features’) of the six policy dimensions 
that make up the overall asylum and refugee policy  
Source: Jeannet et al. 2019.
Randomly allocated values in experiment
1. Anyone can apply for asylum in [YOUR COUNTRY] with no annual limits. 
2. Anyone can apply for asylum in [YOUR COUNTRY] until an annual limit is reached. 
1. No resettlement of United Nations-recognized refugees to [YOUR COUNTRY]
2. Low resettlement of United Nations-recognized refugees to [YOUR COUNTRY] 
 (1 person per 10000 citizens per year, i.e. [ country-specific population]).
3. High resettlement of United Nations-recognized refugees to [YOUR COUNTRY] 
 (2 or more persons per 10,000 citizens per year, i.e. [country-specific population]).
[country-specific population]: For Italy (60 million) in 1b) “6,000”, in 2b) “more than 
12,000”
1. Refused asylum seekers are never sent back to countries where they could face 
serious harm
2. In some cases, refused asylum seekers can be sent back to countries where they 
could face serious harm.
1. A recognized refugee can always bring his/her spouse and children
2. A recognized refugee can bring his/her spouse and children only if the refugee 
can pay for their cost of living
3. A recognized refugee cannot bring his/her spouse and children
1. Each EU country makes its own decisions on asylum applications within its 
 territory. 
2. A centralised European Union agency decides applications for asylum for all EU 
countries.
1. [YOUR COUNTRY] provides unconditional financial assistance to non-EU 
 countries that host refugees.
2. [YOUR COUNTRY] provides financial assistance to non-EU countries that host 
refugees only if they help reduce asylum seekers coming to Europe.
3. [YOUR COUNTRY] provides no financial assistance to non-EU countries that host 
refugees.
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(the right to family life), would reduce rather than 
 increase public  support. 
A key implication of these three insights is that, 
contrary to the impression created in public debates 
in many European countries, it is possible to garner 
public support for asylum and refugee policies that 
provide protection and assistance, but to achieve this, 
policy makers need to think carefully about policy 
designs (e.g., when and how to use policy limits and 
conditions, and how to distribute refugees across geo-
graphical areas) and about how to communicate their 
policy ideas and objectives to the public. The design of 
policy needs to take into account what we know about 
the likely responses from existing residents to various 
different policy options. The communication of pub-
lic policies needs to relate to the reasons behind the 
increasing salience of immigration as a policy issue, 
























Figure 5 Effects of changes in policy  features on the probability of accepting the overall 
asylum and refugee policy  (percentage points)
Source: Jeannet et al. 2019.
Note: This figure shows Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs). Dots indicate point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals from linear (weighted) 
least squares regression. Those on the zero line without confidence intervals denote the reference category for each policy dimension. If a confidence interval 
cuts across the zero line, the change in the policy feature does not have a significant effect on an individual’s support or opposition to the overall asylum and 
refugee policy.
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I
t is widely accepted that international migration 
should be safe, orderly, and regular in order to ben-
efit all stakeholders. 2 Public concerns about immi-
gration in EU member states relate often (though not 
always) to irregular immigration, particularly to the 
implied lack of state control (section 1). For example, 
in the presence of irregular immigration, the desti-
nation country can neither determine the number of 
immigrants overall, nor can it ensure that immigrants 
meet specific criteria to facilitate their economic and 
social integration into the host society (from not hav-
ing a criminal background to possessing language and 
professional skills). 
Irregular immigration occurs in many different 
forms: irregular immigrants (i.e., those without the 
required travel documents/visa) enter the EU via its 
external land border, arrive by boat on the Mediter-
ranean coast, or overstay their (otherwise regular) EU 
visa. Most irregular immigrants apply for asylum in 
the EU, rather than live clandestinely in an EU mem-
ber state; of all applicants for asylum, more than half 
were recognized as refugees in 2018 3 (protection ratios 
vary substantially across countries of origin). Hence, 
while working to constrain irregular immigration is 
in line with good migration policy practice as defined 
by the Global Compact for Migration and with the 
wishes of European voters, EU member states need to 
be aware that potential irregular immigrants may have 
a valid claim to international protection and should 
have access to effective protection either in their re-
gions of origin or in Europe.
When irregular immigrants apply for asylum after 
arriving in the EU, a host of policy questions arise 
that can only be answered satisfactorily by EU mem-
ber states cooperating among themselves and with 
non-EU countries of origin and transit: First, which 
EU member state should be responsible (financially 
and logistically) for receiving the asylum seekers and 
conducting asylum procedures? Second, which EU 
member state should be responsible for hosting those 
who are recognized as refugees, supporting their eco-
nomic and social integration? Third, how should EU 
member states and countries of origin share respon-
sibility for the safe return of those who are not rec-
3 Cooperation with 
non­EU countries to manage 
migration to the EU
3.1 The setting: 
Gaps in the global governance 
of refugee protection and di­
verging  interests among coun­
tries of origin and  destination 
2 The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly on December 19, 2018, www.iom.int/
global-compact-migration.
3 See Eurostat, “Asylum Statistics: Statistics explained,” Brussels (2019), 8, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/5777.pdf.
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ognized as refugees? Effective return and readmission 
procedures are crucial for preserving the integrity of 
the EU asylum system and limiting irregular immi-
gration into the EU by those not entitled to interna-
tional protection. 
Beyond these questions lies a more fundamental 
one: How should EU member states share responsi-
bility for hosting refugees (financially and logistically) 
with countries of first asylum outside Europe? Most 
asylum seekers in the EU come from outside Europe 
(applicants from Turkey and Russia are notable excep-
tions). In the process of traveling to the EU, they typ-
ically transit at least one non-European country that 
hosts significant numbers of their compatriots; for 
example, while many refugees from Eritrea live in the 
EU, a large number also live in Ethiopia.4 As a result, 
refugees who arrive in Europe represent only a small 
proportion of refugees globally and are distinguished 
by being physically robust enough and having access 
to sufficient financial resources to undertake an often 
strenuous and expensive irregular journey. 
The global governance system for refugee protec-
tion offers little practical guidance on responsibility 
sharing among host countries. The logic of the 1951 
Refugee Convention implies that the first safe country 
that an asylum seeker reaches is responsible for con-
ducting asylum procedures and, if international pro-
tection is granted, for hosting the newly recognized 
refugee (Mysen 2017). While the Preamble of the 1951 
Convention recognizes that some host countries may 
be overburdened, it merely calls for international co-
operation in this case, without guidance as to how 
responsibility may be shared equitably.5 At the same 
time, there is no presumption in the Convention that 
asylum seekers may freely choose their country of asy-
lum; rather, Article 31(1) of the Convention states that 
illegal entry into a Contracting State is not to be pe-
nalized (only) if asylum seekers come “directly” from 
a territory where they are persecuted. 
Without a mechanism to allocate asylum seekers to 
host countries (either globally or within the EU), po-
tential host countries that are willing to offer decent 
reception conditions may be concerned they will re-
ceive an excessive number of asylum seekers, ending 
up overburdened. This concern is exemplified by the 
large inflow of irregular immigrants into several EU 
member states, including Sweden and Germany, while 
they kept their borders relatively open in the autumn 
of 2015. In this situation, potential host countries face 
strong incentives to deter asylum seekers by offering 
less and less favorable reception conditions (or to close 
their borders to refugees outright like Sweden at end-
2015); ultimately, a race to the bottom may develop 
among potential host countries in terms of reception 
conditions. The problematic treatment of irregular 
immigrants and asylum seekers at the external EU 
border by several member states (Strik 2019) and the 
ongoing controversies about search and rescue oper-
ations in the southern Mediterranean (Carrera and 
Cortinovis 2019) reflect attempts by EU member states 
to limit irregular immigration by whatever means are 
available to them. 
This situation reflects the public goods nature of 
refugee protection: while all signatory states of the 
1951 Convention and their citizens presumably value 
the fact that persecuted individuals have a right to 
be protected, they are perfectly content when other 
countries, rather than they themselves, provide the re-
quired protection and bear the associated cost (Hatton 
2015). In this sense, a race to the bottom among po-
tential host countries constitutes free-riding behavior 
that typically arises when the supply of a public good is 
insufficiently coordinated among producers. 
Importantly, in low- and middle-income host coun-
tries where most refugees live, such detrimental in-
centives tend to be less pronounced. International 
humanitarian and development donors often fund a 
large share of the fiscal cost of hosting refugees. Given 
their limited administrative capacity, developing 
host countries may still find it challenging to ensure 
access to public services, such as schools and health 
care, for both refugees and residents. Enough invest-
ment in housing and public infrastructure may also 
be difficult to fund and implement. Yet, with sufficient 
international support for refugees and host societies, 
resident populations may even benefit economically 
from the presence of refugees through higher demand 
for locally produced goods and services and, conse-
quently, higher real incomes for residents (Luecke and 
Schneiderheinze 2017). If refugees can live with dig-
nity in their primary host countries, they also have less 
reason to undertake secondary migration to Europe 
(Kuschminder and Waidler 2019).
By contrast, individual EU member states face strong 
incentives to deter asylum seekers from entering their 
territories: member states are individually respon-
sible for the hosting of asylum seekers and the eco-
nomic and social integration of recognized refugees, 
with limited financial support from the EU budget 
(see section 4.2 below for our proposals for more fi-
nancial responsibility sharing among EU member 
states). Furthermore, successive Dublin Regulations 
have allocated responsibility for receiving asylum 
seekers and hosting recognized refugees to the mem-
ber state where asylum seekers first enter EU territory. 
As a result, southern European member states would 
4 Reportedly, 174,000 Eritrean refugees lived in Ethiopia at end-2018 (Zeit Online 2018), out of just under 600,000 Eritrean refugees worldwide (UNHCR 2019, 
Annex table 2). 
5 See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees, UNHCR Communications and Pub-
lic Information Service, Geneva (2010), 13, https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html.
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normally receive a disproportionately large number of 
asylum seekers, relative to their share of the EU’s total 
population. While this has occurred in small mem-
ber states, especially Greece, Cyprus, and Malta (see 
section 4.1 below), other member states have failed to 
properly register newly arriving immigrants, allow-
ing them to move on to more desirable host countries 
within the Schengen area. There are also problematic 
interventions by some member states on the external 
EU border to deter irregular immigrants and poor re-
ception conditions in other member states (see section 
3.2, insight #5 below). 
This analysis suggests that policies to limit irregu-
lar immigration into Europe while protecting refugees 
must be designed and implemented in close coopera-
tion with countries of origin and transit. On the one 
hand, allowing irregular immigration to go ahead un-
restricted would overburden those EU member states 
that would receive most irregular immigrants and 
asylum seekers. On the other hand, ongoing attempts 
by EU member states to limit irregular immigration 
by closing their external borders and ports to asylum 
seekers conflict with humanitarian standards and may 
not be sustainable in the medium to long run. Going 
it alone is simply not a viable strategy in border and 
 migration management for the EU and its member 
states. 
However, it may be politically costly for non-EU 
countries of origin and transit to cooperate with the 
EU, especially for the return and readmission of their 
citizens who have no right to remain in the EU. After 
all, irregular migration is often preferable to no migra-
tion at all from the point of view of irregular migrants 
(who would not migrate otherwise) and their countries 
of origin. Therefore, partner country governments 
will require meaningful compensation to cooperate 
with the EU in border and migration management. 
We argue below that in addition to development co-
operation, legal migration opportunities to the EU are 
one promising area for such cooperation. In the end, 
the underlying agreements with countries of origin 
and transit (whatever their formal or informal na-
ture) need to be ‘self-enforcing’: at all times, each party 
needs to find it in its own best interest to adhere to all 
provisions because not fulfilling a particular (incon-
venient) commitment would lead to the collapse of the 
agreement, leaving all parties individually worse off. 
  Insight #4: Limiting irregular immigration into 
the EU while safeguarding refugees’ access to pro-
tection (either in Europe or in regions of origin) re-
quires close cooperation not only among EU mem-
ber states, but also with countries of origin and 
transit. Yet, countries of origin, transit, and desti-
nation may have diverging interests with respect to 
border and migration management. Therefore, co-
operation needs to cover a sufficiently wide range of 
policy areas so that all parties can be sure to benefit, 
and the underlying agreements become politically 
sustainable and self-enforcing.
3.2 Give and take: 
Areas of  cooperation with 
countries of origin and transit, 
especially in Africa
A
s we have explained in the previous section, it 
is mainly the EU and its member states that 
are interested in stricter border and migration 
management at the EU’s external border. To achieve 
this objective, active support from countries of origin 
and transit is essential. At the same time, supporting 
EU efforts to tighten border management is often un-
popular in countries of origin and transit. Thus, the 
EU and its member states may need to make important 
concessions in other policy areas, including legal mi-
gration opportunities, to arrive at politically sustaina-
ble and self-enforcing agreements. In this section, we 
discuss five insights regarding possible dimensions of 
EU cooperation with countries of origin and transit, 
especially in Africa. In section 4 below, we discuss im-
plications for cooperation among EU member states. 
  Insight #5: If the EU wants to enforce its visa pol-
icy and control the inflow of non-EU nationals into 
the EU, it needs to work with neighboring countries 
to limit access to EU territory to those non-EU cit-
izens who have valid travel documents. Otherwise, 
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particularly if there are no restrictions on irregular 
travel along the informal Mediterranean migration 
routes and on subsequent entry into the EU, large 
numbers of asylum seekers might overwhelm re-
ception capacity in EU member states. Still, given 
the ongoing abuses at the EU’s external border, it 
must be emphasized that border and migration 
management must be in line with humanitarian 
standards and respect migrants’ rights. 
Allowing only travelers with valid documents to enter 
the EU may conflict with the safeguarding of access 
to protection for refugees: after all, some individuals 
without the necessary travel documents may wish to 
apply for asylum in the EU and may be recognized as 
refugees. This dilemma is rooted in the incomplete 
global system of governance for refugee protection. On 
the one hand, neither asylum seekers nor recognized 
refugees are allocated to particular host countries. In-
dividuals can apply for asylum in any country in the 
world if they can physically reach it. As a result, with-
out restrictions on incoming travel, destination coun-
tries with favorable reception conditions for asylum 
seekers would likely find themselves overwhelmed by 
large numbers of applicants (a case in point is Sweden 
in late 2015).
On the other hand, no one has the right to travel 
to any particular country unless that country allows 
them in. Accordingly, the most attractive destination 
countries for asylum seekers, including in the EU, 
have long sought to restrict incoming travel to indi-
viduals with valid travel documents. Visa applicants 
must convince a visa officer that they do not intend to 
remain in the destination country beyond the validity 
of their visa; if an applicant were to indicate that they 
plan to apply for asylum in the EU, they would almost 
certainly be denied a visa, irrespective of their individ-
ual circumstances. 
Short of turning the external EU border into a new 
Iron Curtain, restrictions on access to EU territory 
can only be enforced through close security coop-
eration with neighboring countries and providers of 
international transport services (such as airlines). The 
latter face substantial fines if they transport individ-
uals without valid travel documents to the EU (or 
to many other countries). Under the broad heading 
of European Integrated Border Management, many 
neighboring countries work with the EU to combat 
people smuggling and curb illegal border crossings at 
the EU’s external land border or across the Mediter-
ranean. 
Some EU member states have attempted to 
strengthen control over their external EU borders 
through national measures, including by shutting 
search and rescue vessels out of Italian ports and arti-
ficially slowing down the processing of asylum seekers 
entering Hungary from Serbia and entering Poland 
from Belarus. In a similar vein, it has been proposed 
that the EU transfer all asylum seekers to ‘disembar-
kation platforms’ (reception centers) in non-EU coun-
tries, which (among other things) ignores the fact that 
most asylum applications are not filed by individuals 
who have arrived by boat. Some of these measures 
may not be compatible with humanitarian standards 
or international law (Strik 2019). They also threaten 
to undermine cooperation with partner countries by 
suggesting wrongly that existing challenges can be re-
solved by EU member states acting unilaterally. Rather, 
irregular migration, refugee protection, and the safe-
guarding of migrant rights, including along irregular 
migration routes, need to be resolved through cooper-
ation and responsibility sharing among EU member 
states and with countries of origin and transit. 
Based on these general principles, several specific 
challenges need to be addressed. The following three 
examples illustrate the underlying approach: First, 
while the closure of the Western Balkan migration 
route in early 2016 effectively reduced the number of 
irregular migrants traveling to Central Europe, a sig-
nificant number of migrants were left stranded along 
the way without access to asylum procedures, subsist-
ence support, or options for legal employment or as-
sisted return home. There are also persistent reports of 
human rights violations by border guards when irreg-
ular migrants are caught attempting to cross borders. 
As most Western Balkan countries are candidates for 
EU accession, the EU is well placed to assist Western 
Balkan countries in establishing fully functional asy-
lum systems and subsistence support for migrants.6
Second, EU cooperation with Turkey has been 
successful in that Turkey has reduced sharply the 
number of irregular migrants traveling from Turkey 
to Greece, while the EU and its member states have 
supported Turkey as it hosts more than three million 
refugees from Syria and elsewhere (European Stabil-
ity Initiative, 2019b). For the EU-Turkey understand-
ing to be sustainable, it will be important, inter alia, 
to strengthen the legal status of refugees in Turkey 
(including from countries other than Syria) so that 
rejected asylum seekers can legally be returned to Tur-
key from the Greek islands. In turn, this will require 
a reliable, long-term commitment by the EU and its 
member states to provide financial and technical sup-
port for the hosting of refugees in Turkey and for their 
economic and social integration (see also insight #6 
below). 
Third, in many African countries, interest in emi-
gration is widespread,7 especially among young peo-
6 An early proposal by UNHCR and IOM aims for a regional approach for better refugee protection in the Western Balkans (UNHCR and IOM 2013).
7 According to the Gallup World Poll (Esipova, Pugliese, and Ray, 2018), 33 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans responded affirmatively to the question: “Ideally, if you 
had the opportunity, would you like to move PERMANENTLY to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?”
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ple, and emigrants seek out a wide range of destina-
tion countries within Africa, in the Gulf region, and 
in Europe. For many, migration is a step-by-step pro-
cess where objectives and destination countries may 
change over time (Crawley et al. 2016). Along the way, 
migrants not only encounter opportunities to employ 
their talents and fulfill their aspirations, but also re-
quire large amounts of information on alternative 
options to make good decisions (MEDAM 2018, sec-
tion 3.1). The EU and its member states can continue 
to work with countries of origin and transit and in-
ternational organizations to maintain migrant sup-
port and information centers along migration routes 
to provide objective information on the risks that 
migrants face as they move ahead, convey a realistic 
picture of the living conditions of irregular migrants 
in Europe, point out alternative options for legal mi-
gration in Africa or elsewhere, and arrange support for 
voluntary return home (typically through the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration, IOM) or, possibly, 
resettlement to non-EU countries (through the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR). 
Experience shows that such support can be provided 
even in dangerous conditions such as Libya, where it 
represents a lifeline for migrants stuck in this conflict 
situation (MEDAM 2018, section 1.2).8 
In sum, the EU and its member states cannot fill the 
gaps in the international governance of refugee pro-
tection by hosting all the refugees who would like to 
live in Europe (and have the financial means and ac-
cess to people smuggling networks to travel to Europe 
irregularly). In the absence of rules on how asylum 
seekers and recognized refugees are allocated to host 
countries (at both the global and the EU levels), the EU 
and its member states need to negotiate with countries 
of origin and transit, especially in the EU’s neighbor-
hood, on how to share responsibility for curbing irreg-
ular migration while ensuring that persecuted indi-
viduals have access to protection and safeguarding the 
rights of all migrants irrespective of their legal status 
(as confirmed recently by the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly, and Regular Migration). 
  Insight #6: Low- and middle-income countries 
host most of the world’s refugees. As a matter of hu-
manitarian principle and to discourage secondary 
migration to the EU, the EU should share actively 
in the responsibility for protecting these refugees 
through adequate long-term financial and technical 
support and by working with host countries to facil-
itate the refugees’ economic and social integration.
If access to the EU for irregular migrants is reduced 
through joint border management with neighboring 
countries (see insight #5 above), this will have a two-
fold effect on migrant flows: (i) emigration overall will 
be lower because one option—irregular migration to 
the EU—will become more costly and less attractive; 
and (ii) irregular migrants will be diverted from the 
EU to other destination countries. In particular, perse-
cuted individuals who might be recognized as refugees 
if they could reach EU territory will remain in other 
host countries, which are often poorer than most EU 
member states (a case in point are Syrians now living 
in Lebanon or Turkey). 
This is a problematic outcome because hosting large 
numbers of refugees presents several related chal-
lenges to developing countries with limited financial 
and administrative capacity: first, refugees typically 
require financial support for their subsistence until 
they are sufficiently integrated into the host economy 
to earn their own living; second, refugees may rely on 
public services (schools, health care) or infrastructure 
(water, sanitation, housing) that are already in short 
supply; and third, some residents may experience neg-
ative wage or price shocks due to labor market compe-
tition from refugees. 
Importantly, responsibility for protecting refugees 
can be shared across countries not only by allocating 
refugees to particular host countries, but also through 
financial assistance from rich countries to poorer 
host countries. As discussed in section 3.1 above, 
adequate financial support would not only cover the 
subsistence of refugees, but also fund investment in 
public services and infrastructure. External support 
would benefit not only refugees, but also residents by 
generating additional demand for locally produced 
goods and services (as well as for imports) and raising 
residents’ incomes in the process. The experience of 
many low- and middle-income host countries that re-
ceive external financial support demonstrates that the 
presence of refugees may even have positive economic 
effects overall on residents (Luecke and Schneider-
heinze 2017). 
Already, high-income countries provide substantial 
humanitarian assistance to refugees and their low- and 
middle-income host countries through international 
organizations, especially UNHCR. However, year af-
ter year, available humanitarian funding falls short 
of realistically defined needs. In 2018, funding was 
available for only 56 percent of total needs, which were 
calculated at just under US$25 billion (UN OCHA 
2019, 8). Filling this funding gap would be equivalent 
to harvesting low-hanging fruits: working with other 
high-income countries, the EU should not find it espe-
cially difficult to raise a modest US$11 billion per year 
and enable many refugees to live with dignity who 
now exist in dire circumstances.
8   UNHCR (2019b) summarizes UNHCR resettlement of vulnerable migrants from Libya via Niger through end-May 2019; IOM (2019) reports on ongoing 
 assistance to migrants in Tripoli through IOM’s Voluntary Humanitarian Return program. 
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Beyond increasing humanitarian assistance, exter-
nal financial support may also be provided on a long-
term basis through development cooperation to en-
sure that public services, infrastructure, and economic 
opportunities are available to both refugees and resi-
dents. Most refugees live in “protracted” situations as 
defined by UNHCR: 25,000 or more refugees from the 
same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive 
years or more in a given host country (UNHCR 2019, 
22–23). Thus, it is now considered good practice in ref-
ugee protection to permit and facilitate the full eco-
nomic and social integration of refugees in their host 
country (MEDAM 2018, section 3.3). Even so, many 
developing countries have been reluctant, for fear of 
hurting residents and generating negative attitudes 
toward refugees, to allow refugees to fully integrate 
into the labor market (Zetter and Ruaudel 2016). Re-
cent cooperation between the EU and low-income host 
countries, including Jordan and Ethiopia, for the full 
economic integration of refugees (Barbelet et al. 2018), 
appear promising and point the way toward enhanced 
engagement in the future.
  Insight #7: Whatever the level of external finan-
cial support, small host countries may simply be 
overburdened by a large number of refugees. In 
such cases, the EU should participate actively in re-
settlement schemes for vulnerable refugees.
There may be circumstances when countries of first 
asylum are overburdened by a large number of refugees 
and no amount of external support can compensate, 
for example, for the lack of physical space for housing 
or the scarcity of other critical resources; Syrian refu-
gees in Lebanon or Rohingyas in Bangladesh may be 
cases in point. In such situations, resettlement of par-
ticularly vulnerable refugees to the EU and other high-
er-income countries can provide relief. The number 
of individuals resettled through EU-coordinated pro-
grams has grown steadily to just under 25,000 in 2018.9 
Since 2016, the EU has aimed to establish a per-
manent resettlement framework under its auspices, 
complementing a variety of efforts by member states, 
regional bodies, and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs). Coordinating resettlement efforts at the EU 
level is a promising approach because the number of 
slots for resettlement is quite small: for every refu-
gee resettled, many more are bound to remain in the 
countries of first asylum. Therefore, resettlement may 
usefully be combined with policies to promote the 
economic and social integration of refugees in their 
host countries. To be effective, such policies must be 
based on joint efforts by host country authorities and 
the donor community. The EU is often in a better po-
sition than individual member states to negotiate the 
necessary agreements and ensure that all parties are 
committed to implementing them. By hosting some 
refugees, rather than only providing financial support, 
the EU becomes a more credible participant in such 
efforts. 
  Insight #8: The integrity of the EU asylum system 
depends on effective procedures for the return and 
readmission by their countries of origin of non-EU 
citizens who have no right to remain in the EU. Yet, 
many countries of origin find it politically difficult 
to support the involuntary return of their citizens. 
Despite many agreements on the books, cooper-
ation on return and readmission is often less than 
smooth in practice. The EU should explore with 
countries of origin how additional legal migration 
opportunities, skill partnerships, study visas, etc., 
can make support for involuntary returns politi-
cally sustainable in countries of origin and provide 
a viable alternative to individuals who might other-
wise contemplate irregular migration.
Even if the external EU border is managed well in co-
operation with neighboring countries (see insight #5 
above), some immigrants will enter the EU irregularly 
and apply for asylum. Still more asylum applications 
are filed by individuals who have entered the EU reg-
ularly. EU member states need an effective asylum 
system to respond to the needs of individuals facing 
persecution while ensuring that those applicants who 
are not recognized as refugees return to their coun-
tries of origin. In the absence of effective procedures 
for return, the filing of an asylum application would, 
in practice, allow irregular immigrants to remain in 
the EU indefinitely—which would defeat the purpose 
of EU immigration and visa policies. 
In countries of origin, however, government sup-
port for the involuntary return of their citizens is 
deeply unpopular (e.g., Zanker and Altrogge 2019). At 
the individual level, families rely on remittances from 
emigrants irrespective of legal status. Economy-wide, 
remittances are an important source of external fi-
nancing in many developing economies. A large-scale 
involuntary return of emigrants might also increase 
unemployment. Consequently, many countries of 
 origin are slow to cooperate with requests for the re-
admission of their citizens irrespective of any existing 
agreements. 
This state of affairs is unsatisfactory for all stake-
holders not least because it has encouraged some EU 
member states to prevent irregular migrants from 
entering EU territory in ways that violate humanitar-
ian standards and may be illegal (see the discussion 
9   See European Commission, “Delivering on resettlement: World Refugee Day—20 June 2019,” Brussels (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaf-
fairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20190619_managing-migration-factsheet-delivering-resettlement_en.pdf.
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of insight #5 above). A possible way forward lies in all 
stakeholders recognizing the legitimate interests of 
(i) EU member states in maintaining the integrity of 
their visa and immigration policies and implementing 
effective return and readmission procedures; (ii) coun-
tries of origin in not disrupting the inflow of remit-
tances; and (iii) emigrants, irrespective of legal status, 
in not being uprooted from their host countries where 
many earn their own living and are well integrated so-
cially and economically.
One approach to reforming relevant policies and 
practices in line with this logic would consist of these 
building blocks: first, applying new policies only to 
irregular migrants who arrive in the EU after a cut-
off date (in practice, from now on) and regularizing 
the legal status of those irregular immigrants who will 
realistically never be returned to their countries of or-
igin;10 and second, conditional on active cooperation 
with return and readmission by each country of ori-
gin, expanding opportunities for legal labor migration 
to the EU with supporting measures to promote lan-
guage skills and vocational training and to facilitate 
the social and labor market integration of new immi-
grants. 
Additional legal migration opportunities would 
need to target low- to medium-skilled workers because 
high-skilled (university-educated) individuals already 
face few obstacles migrating to the EU. Under this ap-
proach, the purpose of additional legal migration op-
portunities would not be to address shortages of par-
ticular categories of workers in destination countries; 
rather, the main objective would be to create a political 
environment conducive to cooperation on border and 
migration management, especially return and read-
mission. Furthermore, legal migration opportunities 
might provide a viable alternative to irregular migra-
tion for some individuals—although experience shows 
that, in and of themselves, legal migration opportuni-
ties tend to reduce irregular migration only in a minor 
way (Barslund, di Salvo and Ludolph, 2019). Rather, 
legal migration opportunities would be a crucial com-
ponent of a changed policy mix and irregular migra-
tion would be reduced mainly through more effective 
return and readmission practices. 
Hence, programs for additional legal migration to 
EU member states would be designed with a view to 
ensuring (only) that immigrants are gainfully em-
ployed and provide for their own subsistence on a 
sustainable basis. A variety of approaches are conceiv-
able and should be explored—from seasonal worker 
programs to skill partnerships for vocational training 
in countries of origin that may result in employment 
either at home or in the EU (Triandafyllidou, Barto-
lini and Guidi 2019). Given the potential for abuse and 
exploitation, it will be important to design programs 
with appropriate oversight and involve employment 
agencies and similar bodies to ensure that migrants 
have access to relevant information, including to re-
solve disputes with employers, throughout their stay. 
A somewhat similar program has been in place in 
Germany since 2016 (for at least until end-2020) for 
citizens of Western Balkan countries (Bither and Zie-
barth 2018). It was established as part of an under-
standing with Western Balkan governments in 2015 
that involved, among other elements, cooperation in 
curbing irregular migration to Germany and readmit-
ting failed asylum seekers returning from Germany. 
Up to 20,000 new work visas are available annually for 
citizens of Western Balkan countries provided they 
have an employment contract—which is a much less 
stringent requirement than is normally applied to job 
seekers without a university education. The quotas 
have broadly been filled each year and asylum applica-
tions from Western Balkan countries (which are now 
also considered safe countries of origin by Germany) 
have declined sharply. 
While such bilateral agreements (be they formal or 
informal) between individual EU member states and 
non-EU countries may work as intended, the EU has a 
potentially important role to play in coordinating na-
tional offers of slots for legal migration and negotiating 
on behalf of all member states with non-EU countries: 
the EU makes the ground rules for the European asy-
lum system and plays an increasingly important part 
in securing the external border (witness the expansion 
of Frontex), migration policy, humanitarian aid, and 
development cooperation. Thus, the EU is involved in 
many elements of a possible framework for coopera-
tion with non-EU countries on border and migration 
management (including involuntary return and read-
mission), vocational training (through development 
cooperation), and legal labor migration. Although it 
remains a power of EU member states to determine 
labor market access for non-EU nationals, the EU 
should provide guidance and coordination in nego-
tiations with countries of origin and transit toward a 
shared understanding of the challenges and appropri-
ate policy responses (Barslund et al. 2019).
  Insight #9: Contrary to earlier studies, our empir-
ical research indicates that income growth in low- 
and middle-income countries of origin tends to 
reduce emigration, as does development assistance 
for better public services and social infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, the reductions in emigration due to 
higher income or development assistance are too 
small to render development cooperation an effec-
tive tool to manage emigration.
10 The European Stability Initiative has made similar proposals with a focus on the Central Mediterranean migration route (European Stability Initiative 2018) and 
Gambia (European Stability Initiative 2019a). 
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Many contributors to the public debate on asylum 
and migration policies in Europe call for measures to 
‘combat the root causes of migration’ in order to re-
duce irregular migration. The underlying assumption 
is that development assistance will reduce poverty 
and thus reduce incentives for irregular emigration. 
It is clear that this approach addresses mostly mixed 
migration flows, where many migrants are motivated 
by economic considerations, rather than forced migra-
tion that is mostly due to violent conflict. 
The efficacy of this approach has been called into 
question because, when observed in a cross section 
of countries, emigration prevalence rises along with 
per capita income up to a maximum at approximately 
US$8,000 per year and then declines at higher income 
levels (a ‘migration hump;’ Clemens and Postel 2018). 
This observation has been rationalized on the grounds 
that very poor people may be too poor to afford the 
cost of migrating; only as their incomes rise can they 
begin to realize their migration intentions. This effect 
fades at higher income levels where improving living 
conditions mainly reduce incentives to emigrate and 
thus emigration prevalence. 
If the ‘migration hump’ accurately describes the 
evolution of emigration prevalence over time, suc-
cessful development cooperation that raises per cap-
ita income will increase, rather than reduce emigra-
tion prevalence because per capita income is below 
the crucial threshold in most developing countries. 
In this case, the notion that development coopera-
tion can address the ‘root causes’ of migration and 
effectively reduce emigration prevalence would be 
misguided.
Recent research suggests a more nuanced pic-
ture (Lucas 2019, 17-19). Based on a dataset with a 
time-series as well as a cross-section dimension and 
controlling for other possible determinants of migra-
tion, Benček and Schneiderheinze (forthcoming) find 
that gross emigration flows consistently decline as 
GDP rises. Similarly, Lanati and Thiele (2018, 2019) 
find that higher development assistance is associated 
with lower emigration prevalence overall; this effect 
is larger when development cooperation is targeted at 
public services and social infrastructure rather than 
income growth and when the statistical analysis is re-
stricted to ‘transferred aid’ (excluding, for example, 
support for refugees from developing countries hosted 
by the donor country). Once again, this effect is small: 
doubling development assistance would reduce emi-
gration prevalence by only 15 percent.
This discussion suggests that development coop-
eration may be a useful tool to pursue other policy 
objectives, but it is not suited to managing irregular 
migration to the EU. Migration from low-income to 
high-income countries needs to be managed closely to 
ensure that migrants are well integrated into the la-
bor market at destination and their presence benefits 
all stakeholders. Targeted measures like skill partner-
ships may be part of the institutional framework of 
development cooperation, but their usefulness would 
be based on the skills transmitted, rather than on their 
impact on per capita income. Development assistance 
would also not help to avoid the difficult decisions to 
be made in enforcing asylum decisions and visa pol-
icies, including the involuntary return of individuals 
who have no right to stay in the EU. 
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I
nternational cooperation and solidarity are key in-
gredients in managing migration to and from EU 
member states and contributing to refugee protec-
tion world-wide. A number of policy tools are available 
that enable the EU and its member states to meet their 
humanitarian responsibility towards non-EU coun-
tries that host refugees. These include resettlement of 
UNHCR-recognized refugees to the EU, the provision 
of humanitarian visas in countries of origin or transit, 
and financial support to non-EU host countries and 
international organizations that assist refugees. More-
over, legal pathways for labor migration may provide 
alternative options for some individuals who would 
otherwise contemplate irregular migration, serve as 
an instrument for economic development, and be-
come part of a more effective migration management 
framework in cooperation with countries of origin 
and transit (section 3). 
This section details how the external dimension 
of asylum and migration policy should be comple-
mented by reforms to internal policies under the EU’s 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (section 
4.1), and how further centralization and support are 
needed to enhance solidarity among member states.11 
We build upon the core arguments put forward in 
MEDAM (2017, 2018) to focus on two key elements: 
more financial support from the EU budget for mem-
ber states as well as the international community (sec-
tion 4.2), and an EU mechanism to monitor member 
states’ contributions to border management and ref-
ugee protection (section 4.3). The monitoring mech-
anism would support a peer review by member states 
of how common and inter-connected tasks in asylum 
and migration policy are shared by individual member 
states in line with the principle of flexible solidarity.
4 Implementing flexible 
 solidarity
4.1 Moving forward on the 
Common European Asylum 
System
11 The interdependent nature of internal and external migration policies is laid out in MEDAM (2017, 2018). An effective EU asylum and migration policy requires 
both dimensions to be well functioning. 
12  See European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council,” COM(2016) 468 final, Brussels (July 13, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/
home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160713/resettlement_sys-
tem_en.pdf; see also MEDAM (2017, 2018) and European Commission, “Managing Migration in all its aspects: progress under the European agenda on migration,” 
COM(2018) 798 final, Brussels (4 December 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/eu-communication-migration-euco-04122018_
en_1.pdf, and other references herein.
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ince the number of asylum applications multi-
plied in 2015, following the war in Syria, reform 
of the EU’s asylum and migration policy has 
been one of the main policy challenges for the EU. 
Central to the efforts to reform the CEAS is a package 
of seven proposals—some of which update existing 
legislation—initially tabled by the European Commis-
sion in 2016. 12 
The seven legislative proposals aim at increasing 
harmonization of asylum procedures and reception 
conditions, responsibility sharing among member 
states, and EU technical capacity. The first part of 
the package includes a proposal for the reform of the 
Dublin Regulation (the ‘first country of arrival’ prin-
ciple); amendment of the Eurodac Regulation in order 
to increase, harmonize, and better share information 
among member states; and establishment of an EU 
asylum agency, to replace the European Asylum Sup-
port Office (EASO) with a fully-fledged EU agency. 
The second part of the package includes a proposal 
for reforming the Reception Conditions Directive, to 
harmonize reception conditions across member states 
with the aim of limiting secondary movement; a new 
qualification regulation and a new asylum procedure 
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regulation, to set common standards for granting in-
ternational protection and define the relevant proce-
dures; and, finally, an EU resettlement framework to 
complement the national programs.
Making progress on the legislative agenda 
  Insight #10: The start of the new European Com-
mission’s mandate provides an opportunity to re-
consider the approach taken towards the reform 
of the Common European Asylum System. The 
current package approach—whereby agreement 
is sought on all legislative files simultaneously—
means that the contentious proposal for reforming 
the Dublin Regulation is blocking any further pro-
gress. Pursuing a file-by-file approach and moving 
forward on those individual legislative proposals 
where there is broad agreement among member 
states can break the present deadlock.
There is broad agreement on five of the seven propos-
als, which have reached the trilogue negotiations be-
tween the Council, the European Parliament, and the 
Commission, though none of them has been finally 
adopted.13 The two remaining proposals, for reform 
of the Dublin Regulation and the Asylum Procedures 
Directive, have led to well-known controversies and 
the Council has been unable to reach a common po-
sition.14
In our second MEDAM Assessment Report 
(MEDAM 2018, section 1.1), we emphasized the need 
for progress on harmonizing member states’ asylum 
systems by adopting the agreed part of the current re-
form package as well as the need for faster and more 
effective asylum procedures. The key arguments are 
that protracted and differentiated asylum procedures 
not only lead to differential treatment of similar asy-
lum cases and increase the risk of onward movement 
from the country of first arrival (absconding) if asy-
lum prospects are perceived to be better in another EU 
country; they may also hinder integration for individ-
uals who need protection, as well as return to coun-
tries of origin for people without a valid claim for legal 
residency in the EU (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and 
Lawrence 2016).
There are no legal or technical barriers to adopting 
each proposal on its own.15 Apart from enhancing the 
harmonization of asylum systems (and asylum appli-
cation outcomes), the proposals on the transformation 
of EASO and the European resettlement framework 
are also important for the wider application of sol-
idarity, both within the EU and with non-EU coun-
tries hosting refugees: The asylum agency will improve 
support to member states temporarily overburdened 
by applications, while the resettlement framework will 
enable centralized, EU-level cooperation with non-EU 
countries on resettlement, for example, in connection 
with people evacuated from Libya to Niger (see section 
3.2, insight #7, and MEDAM 2018, section 1.1). 
While there is scope for agreeing on the majority 
of the files in the CEAS reform package, we remain 
cautious as to the political feasibility of reforming 
the Dublin Regulation toward mandatory relocation 
among EU member states—mainly because member 
states continue to be deeply split on this issue. Vari-
ous member states have tabled variants of the initial 
proposal during their presidencies of the European 
Council, but there are few signs that the Council has 
moved closer to adopting a common position over the 
last three years; differences in viewpoints may even 
have widened since 2016.
Given these realities, to make progress on the CEAS 
the next European Commission should abandon the 
‘package approach’ and focus its efforts on those files 
where there is already substantial agreement among 
EU member states and progress can be made. The 
Commission should embed any reform of the Dublin 
Regulation into a wider framework of flexible solidar-
ity with voluntary relocations (see below and section 
4.3). A shift in priorities will also leave more energy 
and room to pursue a flexible framework for voluntary 
relocations, which would help to address the current 
situation involving rescued migrants in the Mediter-
ranean.
A flexible solidarity approach to reforming 
the Dublin Regulation
Reform of the Dublin Regulation is often seen as a 
magic bullet in establishing a common EU migration 
and asylum policy. Yet, agreement on any one ver-
sion of the Dublin reform that have circulated in re-
cent years would not make a fundamental difference 
on the ground in terms of where asylum seekers are 
hosted, except for the small Mediterranean countries 
of Greece, Malta, and Cyprus. In general, according to 
one measure of how asylum applications are dispersed 
among member states, asylum applications are now 
more equally shared among EU member states than 
at any point in time over the last 20 years (figure 7). 
Given the current distribution of asylum applications, 
any relocation mechanism that redistributes asylum 
13  These five proposals are the amendment of the Eurodac Regulation, the new qualification directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the new European 
agency for asylum regulation and the new EU resettlement framework.
14  See MEDAM (2017, 2018) for more detailed accounts.
15  See European Commission 2018, ibid.
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seekers more equally among larger member states 
would imply asylum seekers being relocated from 
Germany to Poland, Romania, or Italy – countries that 
currently receive few applications relative to the size of 
their populations. With the divisiveness sown by the 
initial proposal for reforming the Dublin Regulation, 
it is difficult to imagine such an arrangement running 
smoothly;16 furthermore, it might lead to more irregu-
lar secondary migration (MEDAM 2018, section 1.1).
Greece, Malta, and Cyprus continue to receive a dis-
proportionately large number of asylum applications 
relative to their populations. For Malta and Cyprus, 
the number of individuals applying is small in abso-
lute numbers—8,000 applications combined in 2018—
whereas the problem for Greece is the lack of returns 
to Turkey following the EU-Turkey agreement. The 
situations in Malta and Cyprus can be handled as part 
of a wider framework for voluntary relocation (as dis-
cussed below). 
A total of around 64,000 people applied for asylum 
in Greece in 2018. A small share (less than 10 percent) 
was transferred to other EU countries under the Dub-
lin Regulation for family reasons (European Stability 
Initiative 2019b).17 However, hotspots on the Aegean 
Islands continue to fill up beyond capacity, and it is 
well documented that the conditions are appalling 
(AIDA and Greek Council for Refugees 2019). The 
situation in Greece is further complicated by the in-
crease in arrivals across the land border with Turkey 
(18,000 in 2018). These individuals are not covered 
by the EU-Turkey agreement and a third of them are 
Turkish citizens.18 
Improving conditions for asylum seekers on the 
Greek islands requires efforts by the Greek govern-
ment to improve accommodation on the islands as 
well as the effectiveness of the Greek asylum system. 
It also requires support from member states in terms 
of assisting EU agencies, notably EASO, in helping 
Greek efforts. EU institutions need to work to  improve 
 returns of asylum seekers to Turkey under the 
EU-Turkey agreement and to facilitate credible com-
mitments to relocate recognized refugees from Greece 
to other EU member states under a framework of flex-
ible solidarity (MEDAM 2018, section 1.1).19 Finally, 
full implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement also 
involves the relocation of Syrian refugees from Turkey 
to the EU in return for Turkey taking back asylum 
seekers from the Greek islands.
A long-term approach to addressing irregular cross-
ings of the Mediterranean has to rely on international 
cooperation on a number of issues: (i) who undertakes 
search and rescue of people at sea; (ii) access to proper 
asylum procedures for those rescued, acknowledging 
that in the past most people crossing were not eligible 
for protection (Barslund, Di Salvo, and Ludolph 2019); 
and (iii) the difficulties of returning individuals not in 
need of protection once they are in the EU (discussed 
in section 3.2, insight #8). 
Regarding search and rescue operations (i), if 
non-EU countries are not able to fulfill their commit-
ments or EU member states request help in fulfilling 
theirs, the Border and Coast Guard Agency can offer 
extensive EU-level support. Regarding access to asy-
lum (ii), individuals arriving in the EU from across the 
Mediterranean should have their asylum applications 
processed by the member state of arrival with support 
from the new asylum agency and assistance with the 
return of unsuccessful applicants to their countries of 
origin (iii) from the Border and Coast Guard Agency 
(MEDAM 2017). As would be the case for all other 
member states, if a country on the Mediterranean 
shore is overburdened, relocation among a coalition of 
willing member states should be pursued, following a 
systematic process.
With a long-term strategy to reduce irregular immi-
gration through better border management together 
with neighboring countries, faster return of unsuc-
cessful asylum applicants, expanded opportunities 
16  By the same token, the so-called crisis resilience argument for mandatory relocation, i.e., that mandatory relocation would work well should the EU have 
another spike in asylum seekers, is not particularly robust.
17  Very few transfers are executed toward Greece.
18  See Frontex, “Risk Analysis for 2019”, 20 February 2019 (Warsaw), https://frontex.europa.eu/publications/risk-analysis-for-2019-RPPmXE
19  See European Commission, “Managing migration in all its aspects: Progress under the European Agenda on Migration,” COM(2018) 798 final, Brussels (2018) 
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Figure 6 Number of asylum applications per 1,000 
inhabitants and their dispersion among EU countries 
(coefficient of variation), 1999–2018
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat. 
Note: The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of number of applications divided 
by the number of applications per 1,000 persons.
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for regular labor migration to Europe, and more slots 
for resettling refugees directly from non-EU countries 
(section 3.2), the large Mediterranean countries are 
unlikely to receive a disproportionately high num-
ber of asylum applications relative to many other EU 
countries (see also MEDAM 2018, sections 1.1 and 1.2 
for a more in-depth discussion).
  Insight #11: Only a few small EU member states 
are currently overburdened by a disproportionately 
high number of asylum applications (mainly Cy-
prus, Malta, and Greece). Given continuing disa-
greement over the feasibility and extent of a manda-
tory relocation scheme for asylum seekers, it should 
now be a priority to establish working procedures 
for a coalition of willing countries to relocate asy-
lum seekers rescued in the Central Mediterranean. 
Such procedures would go a long way to relieve the 
few countries that are truly overburdened.
Flexible solidarity means more solidarity
A common, well-managed migration and asylum 
policy at the EU level has benefits for all EU member 
states, along with migrants and asylum seekers. At the 
same time, mismanagement in this policy area by indi-
vidual member states can have negative consequences 
for other member states in the form of more irregu-
lar crossings into the EU and subsequent secondary 
movements. The Schengen area, which appears to be 
valued by all member states, implies in principle that 
the EU’s external borders are shared by all member 
states. Moreover, because international cooperation is 
important, there is value in acting together as a bloc, as 
was the case with the EU-Turkey agreement. 
Moving forward on a common asylum policy with-
out mandatory relocation does not imply a need for 
less EU involvement in migration and asylum poli-
cies, nor the need for less solidarity. However, because 
of differences in geography, history, cultural ties with 
non-EU countries, and ingrained preferences toward 
migration, member states are bound to play different 
roles in asylum and migration policy. At the same 
time, member states should share the fiscal burden 
of hosting refugees fairly, even if their roles differ. 
This calls for EU financial and technical support for 
those member states that bear a disproportionate fis-
cal burden, even if member states remain responsi-
ble for managing their own asylum systems because 
centralization at the EU level is legally and politically 
difficult. Moreover, our research on attitudes towards 
EU asylum policy suggests that centralizing deci-
sions on asylum application in an EU agency would 
reduce public support for asylum and refugee policy 
(section 2). 
For optimal management of the external border, 
we have welcomed a stronger role by an EU institu-
tion in protecting external borders, as is foreseen with 
the build-up of the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency. The agency is also expected to assist member 
states in carrying out the return of individuals who 
have been asked to leave EU territory. For an effective 
migration policy, the importance of being able to re-
turn individuals not found to be needing protection 
is discussed in section 3 (insight #8) and a previous 
MEDAM report (2018, section 1.2).
Discussions of solidarity often center around the 
distribution of spontaneous asylum seekers (i.e., those 
entering the host country at a land border, airport 
or seaport after being rescued at sea). Yet, a compre-
hensive approach to migration management entails a 
broader view also covering legal migration, resettle-
ment of refugees from non-EU countries, and emer-
gency evacuations using humanitarian visas (section 
3; MEDAM 2018). This approach calls for financial 
support from the EU budget not only for member 
states hosting spontaneous asylum seekers or those 
relocated within the EU or refugees resettled directly 
from non-EU countries, but also to support labor mi-
gration when it furthers the goals of the overall migra-
tion policy of the EU. 
Financial solidarity is most easily attainable through 
the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). 
Adequate funding for the Border and Coast Guard 
Agency and the proposed asylum agency is impera-
tive. Adding more support from the EU budget toward 
the costs of integration of recognized refugees is also 
important, as is more support for non-EU countries 
hosting refugees and cooperating with the EU on mi-
gration management (section 3). In some instances, 
EU institutions will also have to rely on member states 
for physical or human resources, such as equipment 
for the Border and Coast Guard Agency or staff for 
asylum hotspots on the Greek islands. 
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N
egotiations on the upcoming MFF for the pe-
riod 2021–27 were officially launched in May 
2018 when the European Commission present-
ed its proposal for the next long-term EU budget. The 
Commission’s budget proposal includes several items 
related to asylum and migration policy. We discuss 
them in this section and propose new items to support 
and strengthen the principle of solidarity in this policy 
area.20 
The Commission proposal for the Asylum 
and Migration Fund and European Social 
Fund+
The current Commission proposal envisages that 
overall, the funds dedicated to the management of 
external borders, migration, and asylum will reach 
nearly €33 billion, compared with €13 billion in the 
MFF 2014–20.21 An overview of the proposed changes 
in comparison with the expiring MFF can be found in 
table 2. These funds do not include either EU external 
actions in general or EU humanitarian aid in particu-
lar, part of which will be used in the area of migration 
and asylum, as explained below. Despite the increased 
attention on asylum and migration, funds for asylum, 
migration, and borders only make up 3 percent of the 
total forthcoming proposed MFF (Westerby 2018a). 
Of the total €33 billion for these items, only €11.3 is al-
located to the management of migration and asylum, 
most of which is earmarked for the Asylum and Mi-
gration Fund (AMF) and the rest for the decentralized 
agencies.22 
Notably, in the proposed MFF 2021–27, the AMF 
focuses on short-term actions related to migration 
and asylum (such as the initial reception and reg-
istration of asylum seekers) as well as the initiation 
of integration measures (such as language courses). 
Funding for the medium- to long-term integration 
of non-EU nationals in general and refugees in par-
ticular is instead foreseen under the European Social 
Fund+ (ESF+), which, under the current proposal, 
will merge several existing funds.23 While the Com-
mission allocates a total budget of €101.2 billion to the 
ESF+, and the socioeconomic integration of non-EU 
 External borders Migration and asylum
 MFF 2014–20 MFF 2021–27 MFF 2014–20 MFF 2021–27
Internal Security Fund  2.7 Integrated Border 9.3 Asylum, Migration,   6.9 Asylum and 10.4
(borders and visas)   Management Fund  and Integration Fund   Migration Fund 
Decentralized 2.9 Decentralized 12 Decentralized 0.45 Decentralized  0.9 
agencies  agencies  agencies  agencies
Total 5.6  21.3  7.35  11.3
4.2 An EU budget to support 
needed change
Table 2 Budgetary changes in the MFF 2021–27 compared with the MFF 2014–20
(€, billion)
20  Negotiations on the next MFF are still ongoing and various European institutions and stakeholders continue to submit their comments and proposals. 
Recently, the European Parliament passed an extensive legislative resolution on the proposed Asylum and Migration Fund (see European Parliament, “European 
Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Asylum and 
Migration Fund,” (2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0175_EN.pdf). To what extent the Commission will pick up the proposed 
changes and amendments remains to be seen.
21  See European Commission, “Migration and border management,” Migration and border management—legal texts and factsheets, Brussels (2018), https://publi-
cations.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/6dea386a-5269-11e8-be1d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.
22  These are the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), EASO, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, European 
Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), Europol, and the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). See European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 
Asylum and Migration Fund,” Brussels (2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:4ea760be-6f0d-11e8-9483-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&for-
mat=PDF.
23  The ESF+ is intended to merge the existing ESF, Youth Employment Initiative, Fund for European Aid to the most Deprived, Employment and Social Innovation 
Programme, and EU Health Programme.
Source: European Commission, “Migration and border management,” Migration and border management—legal texts and factsheets, Brussels (2018), 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/6dea386a-5269-11e8-be1d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.
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24  See also European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+),” Brussels 
(2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-european-social-fund-plus-regulation_en.pdf.
25  See European Commission, “Proposal on the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+),” (2018).
26  See European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and 
International Cooperation Instrument,” Brussels (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-neighbourhood-develop-
ment-international-regulation_en.pdf.
27  See European Commission “Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI),” Neighbourhood and the world—legal texts and 
factsheets, Brussels (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-neighbourhood-development-cooperation_en.pdf.
28  See European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and 
International Cooperation Instrument,” Brussels (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-neighbourhood-develop-
ment-international-regulation_en.pdf.
29  See European Commission, “EU humanitarian aid,” Neighbourhood and the world—legal texts and factsheets, Brussels (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commissi-
on/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-humanitarian-aid_en.pdf.
nationals is listed as a specific objective of the ESF+, 
the current proposal for the fund does not ring-fence 
financial means exclusively for this purpose (Lecerf 
2019; Westerby 2018a).24
Funding for EU border agencies, external 
actions, and humanitarian aid
The EU budget for the management of external bor-
ders is to see an even stronger boost. The marked 
increase in the budget for the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency is intended for the creation of 
a standing corps of 10,000 border guards. The EU 
agency for asylum will replace EASO.25 
Regarding the EU’s external actions, the MFF 
2021–27 envisages the creation of a “Neighbourhood, 
Development, and International Cooperation Instru-
ment” (NDICI). A corresponding regulation has been 
proposed by the Commission.26 The instrument will 
bring together nine separate instruments and funds 
from the current MFF, as well as part of the European 
Development Fund, which was outside the MFF 2014–
20 (Immenkamp 2019). The Commission proposes a 
total budget of €89.2 billion for the NDICI in the new 
MFF, which represents an increase of 11 percent com-
pared with the expiring MFF. The bulk of this budget 
is foreseen to cover programmed cooperation with 
neighborhood and all other non-EU countries, while 
smaller amounts are earmarked for thematic issues of 
a global nature or political flagship initiatives, and for 
crisis management, conflict prevention, and resilience 
building. The remaining funding forms an additional 
flexibility cushion for emerging challenges and priori-
ties. Importantly, the proposal for the NDICI foresees 
a horizontal spending target of 10 percent for tackling 
the root causes of irregular migration and creating 
conditions for legal migration and well-managed mo-
bility. In addition, the rapid-response and the flex-
ibility cushion could be used to mobilize short-term 
responses to critical situations related to migration.27 
The next MFF further foresees an increase in the 
budget for EU humanitarian aid by 30 percent to €11 
billion. EU humanitarian aid will continue to go to 
vulnerable people exclusively through the EU’s hu-
manitarian partners, such as United Nations agencies, 
NGOs, and international organizations, but not gov-
ernments. While no funds are explicitly earmarked 
for migration and asylum, EU humanitarian aid pro-
vides emergency assistance to refugees and displaced 
persons in various conflict zones around the globe.28 
For example, in 2017 the EU Civil Protection and Hu-
manitarian Aid program gave more than €2 billion, or 
90 percent of its annual budget, to projects for forcibly 
displaced persons and their host communities in 49 
countries.29
Reactions to the Commission proposal
A central line of criticism from stakeholders in Euro-
pean asylum and migration policy is the intended al-
location of short-term reception and early integration 
measures to the AMF and the delegation of the me-
dium- to long-term socioeconomic integration to the 
ESF+. Stakeholders object that integration policy may 
not easily be reduced to a series of chronological steps, 
which is why the intended split may put the effective-
ness of the resource allocation at risk (ECRE and PI-
CUM 2019). Others fear a gap in funding for medium- 
to long-term integration due to the ESF+ not explicitly 
earmarking funds for the socioeconomic integration 
of non-EU nationals (Westerby 2018b).
Another concern refers to the future involvement 
of civil society and local authorities in integration 
efforts. Statistics on disbursements of the Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund as part of the MFF 
2014–20 show that the involvement of these actors dif-
fers strongly across member states (Westerby 2019). 
National governments that tend to oppose actions on 
integration might be able to preempt NGOs and oth-
ers from receiving funding from the AMF and ESF+ 
(ECRE and PICUM 2018), while the necessity for 
funding recipients to obtain co-financing might serve 
as an additional barrier to small and nongovernmental 
actors (Westerby 2018b).
Recommendations regarding the split competencies 
of the two funds involve promoting the earmarking of 
specific percentages of the funding directly managed 
at the EU level for civil society actors and local author-
ities, while simultaneously limiting the allocation of 
national EU asylum and migration funding to state 
authorities and agencies (ECRE and PICUM 2018; 
Westerby 2019).
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Year   Compensation   Major recipients
  (€, billion)  (>10% of total compensation)
 Trigger at 100%  Trigger at 150% Trigger at 100%  Trigger at 150%
2012 0.84  0.66 SE, AT, BE, FR  SE, AT, BE
2013 1.05  0.67 SE, DE, HU  SE, HU, AT
2014 1.77  1.77 SE, DE, HU  SE, DE, HU
2015 5.42  5.39 SE, DE, HU, AT  SE, DE, HU, AT
2016 5.31  5.17 DE  DE
2017 1.70  1.00 DE, EL, IT  EL, IT
2018 1.35  0.63 EL, DE, FR  EL, CY
2019 1.33  0.56 DE, EL  EL
2020 1.28  0.60 EL, DE, FR  EL
Total 20.06  16.44  
Total 2017–2020 5.67  2.78  
Table 3 Financial compensation based on flexible solidarity 
In all likelihood, the potential problem of vague 
competencies for integration being shared by the two 
funds cannot be fully addressed within the proposed 
MFF 2021–27, as neither will the funding for the AMF 
be increased so much as to cover the entire integra-
tion process, nor will the competencies for integration 
be fully transferred to the ESF+. Focusing on effective 
monitoring and improving the availability of statistics 
on disbursements and recipients is hence a more feasi-
ble way forward. 
A compensation mechanism for flexible 
solidarity
  Insight #12: Negotiations on the EU’s 2021-2027 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) offer an 
important window for strengthening financial sol-
idarity among member states with respect to asy-
lum and immigration. A dedicated budget line that 
compensates member states for each asylum seeker 
received (possibly above a threshold) would be one 
effective tool to ensure more solidarity. The same 
mechanism could be used to support the voluntary 
relocation of refugees among member states.
In MEDAM (2018), we envisaged a centralized sys-
tem of financial burden sharing resting on the prin-
ciple of flexible solidarity. Such a mechanism would 
pay financial compensation to member states that 
receive more applications for asylum than foreseen 
by a distribution key (i.e., rather than relocating asy-
lum seekers in line with the distribution key). Similar 
to that envisaged by the European Commission, our 
proposed distribution key for financial compensation 
would give equal weight to each member state’s GDP 
and population relative to the EU total in the com-
putation of a ‘target’ number of asylum applications 
for each member state. A one-time compensation of 
€10,000 would be disbursed for every additional ap-
plication accepted above the designated number of 
applications. This proposed compensation amount 
is in line with the Commission proposal for a Union 
resettlement framework, which foresees compensa-
tion of €10,000 from the EU budget for each refugee 
resettled by an EU member state participating in the 
framework.30 A compensation of that order would go 
some way in covering initial costs of reception after 
arrival. 
The proposed amount would follow the individual 
in the case of relocation to another EU country. To 
support relocation, it may be preferable to introduce 
further compensation on top of the €10,000. However, 
for simplicity, we leave this out of the calculation be-
low. 
30  See European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and 
amending Regulation (EU) No. 516/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council,“ COM(2016) 468 final, Brussels (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160713/resettlement_system_en.pdf.
Source: Eurostat.
Note: Own calculations based on the number of asylum applications; figures for the years 2019 and 2020 are extrapolated; 
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; CY = Cyprus; DE = Germany; EL = Greece; FR = France; HU = Hungary; IT = Italy; and SE = Sweden.
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In table 3, we present hypothetical compensation 
payments based on our proposed mechanism. For the 
period 2012–18, our calculations are based on Eurostat 
statistics for first-time applications for asylum,31 while 
we extrapolate the corresponding numbers for 2019 
and 2020 as a simple moving average of the two pre-
vious years. Choosing a compensation payment above 
€10,000 per applicant would lead to a proportional in-
crease in the amounts in table 3.
Assuming that the compensation mechanism would 
kick in if a member state accepted more than 150 per-
cent32 of its designated first-time applications, com-
pensation payments would have been €0.6 billion in 
2018. By far the largest share (85.7 percent) of these 
payments would have been allocated to Greece, with 
Cyprus and Malta also being among the beneficiaries. 
For 2017, Italy would also have received significant 
compensation, which, even with lower compensation 
for Austria, would have raised the total compensa-
tion payments to close to €1 billion for that year. Our 
projections for 2019 and 2020 indicate a funding need 
of less than €0.7 billion per year. Notably, our back-
ward-looking calculations for the years 2012 and 2013 
preceding the latest migration crisis are very close 
to our projections for the last two years of the cur-
rent MFF. However, if the compensation mechanism 
was activated at 100 percent instead of 150 percent, 
it would double the funding requirement in 2017–20. 
This is due to first-time applicants being more spread 
out across member states during this period in com-
parison with 2015 and 2016. As a result, more member 
states would exceed the 100 percent threshold than at 
the peak of the migration crisis. 
In view of the total financial envelope for migra-
tion and asylum in the MFF 2021–27 outlined above, 
we consider these sums to be both financially and 
politically feasible. Unsurprisingly, the implied com-
pensation would quickly escalate in the course of a 
new inflow of asylum seekers at the level of 2015–16 
if imbalances in the distribution of first-time appli-
cations remained at present levels. Both the Com-
mission’s proposition for a mandatory relocation of 
asylum seekers and our conception of flexible soli-
darity in terms of financial compensation would be 
stretched to their respective limits in such a situa-
tion.
  Insight #13: The next MFF should also increase 
support for other important elements of European 
migration and asylum policies. The EU Asylum 
and Border and Coast Guard Agencies should be 
put in a position to provide additional assistance to 
member states as needed. Likewise, the EU budget 
should support programs aiding resettlement from 
third countries (insight #7), humanitarian visas 
(when warranted), and labor migration schemes 
(insight #8). Additional funding for refugees hosted 
by non-EU countries is also warranted on humani-
tarian grounds and to discourage secondary migra-
tion to Europe (insight #6).
In table 4, we present a projection of the costs and ben-
eficiaries of our proposed compensation mechanism 
for flexible solidarity, as well as other frameworks that 
are already being prepared or debated and might hence 
become relevant for the areas of asylum and migration 
in the MFF 2021–27. For the flexible solidarity mecha-
nism, we assume an annual compensation amount of 
€700 million based on our projection of total compen-
sation of €2.8 billion for the years 2017–20. The pro-
jected €4.9 billion provided for flexible solidarity over 
the MFF 2021–27 translates into coverage of 490,000 
31  Due to missing information on the number of first-time applicants for asylum in Austria in 2012 and 2013, and in Hungary in 2012, we use instead information 
on the total number of  asylum applications from Eurostat.
32  This threshold mirrors the threshold that would trigger the relocation of asylum seekers in the reform of the Common European Asylum System proposed by 
the European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants_en.
Item Compensation Arrivals per year Individuals covered
  (€, billion)  
Flexible solidarity for asylum seekers 4.9 70,000 490,000
Union resettlement framework 3.5 50,000 350,000
Union humanitarian visa framework 0.7 10,000 70,000
Legal pathways to EU labor markets 7.0 50,000 350,000
Total 16.1 180,000 1,260,000
Table 4 Potential financial compensation in the MFF 2021–27
Source: Own calculations. 
Note: For the development of legal pathways to EU labor markets €1 billion annually (€7 billion for the full 2021-2027 MFF) is foreseen in order to provide training 
and training facilities for around 100,000 potential labor migrants per year. Of these, 50,000 is estimated to arrive in the EU to take up a job. The remainder will 
use their training for employment in their country of origin.
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  Insight #14: To move the EU’s asylum and mi-
gration policy forward towards more solidarity 
among EU member states and with non-EU coun-
tries that host refugees, we recommend that the new 
Commission establish a monitoring mechanism (or 
scoreboard) to collect information on each member 
state’s exposure and contribution to all elements of 
asylum and migration policy (irrespective of area 
of competence). The scoreboard would support an-
nual discussions on voluntary relocation and other 
instruments of solidarity.
As they implement the principle of flexible solidarity, 
EU member states would contribute to European ef-
forts to provide humanitarian protection and enhance 
the global governance of migration through a variety 
of instruments. To ensure that, overall, member states 
share in these responsibilities equitably, the contri-
butions from member states must be compared with 
their capacities in the different areas of asylum and 
migration-related policies. This raises the questions of 
(i) how to monitor member states’ contributions and 
(ii) which activities should be viewed as making a rele-
vant contribution to European efforts.
The European Pillar of Social Rights as a 
possible model
The framework employed for monitoring the Euro-
pean Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) could be applied to 
this context as well. Both, social policy and asylum and 
migration policy differ across member states in terms 
of historical roots and experiences, while achieving 
progress is considered a shared political commitment 
and responsibility among EU member states.33 
The European Semester provides a suitable set-up 
for monitoring national policies in this context as it 
accounts for differences across countries while struc-
asylum seekers over the same period. Regarding the 
proposed Union resettlement framework, we assume 
50,000 as the number of refugees to be resettled annu-
ally. This number is based on the fact that the current 
temporary EU resettlement scheme intends to resettle 
50,000 refugees from December 2017 to October 2019. 
We expect a fully elaborated framework to be more 
ambitious.
Given the aforementioned compensation of €10,000 
per resettled refugee, our projection foresees a budget 
of €3.5 billion for the Union resettlement framework 
in the MFF 2021–27. In addition, potential EU initi-
atives for humanitarian visa schemes have recently 
been discussed (Backhaus, Barslund, and Nannerini, 
forthcoming). Covering 10,000 asylum seekers annu-
ally who arrive in the EU on humanitarian visas at the 
per capita compensation rate of €10,000 would result 
in budget needs of €0.7 billion. Finally, future EU mi-
gration policies will likely invest in schemes for legal 
labor migration from developing countries to Europe. 
A proposal for an EU-Africa partnership along these 
lines has recently been formulated by Barslund et al. 
(2019). They suggest that a genuine labor mobility 
partnership for 50,000 people per year entering Euro-
pean labor markets would need funding in the range 
of €1 billion annually. 
The proposed measures to increase solidarity via the 
EU budget are ambitious. All together they are pro-
jected to cost more than €16 billion over the 7 years of 
the MFF. Changing any of the suggested parameters 
regarding the size of compensation payments or the 
thresholds at which compensation would set in, could 
alter the total cost substantially. Thus, while these pro-
jections only indicate approximate orders of magni-
tude, it is clear that total funding needs would be large 
compared with the Commission’s proposed MFF allo-
cation to the Asylum and Migration Fund (€10.4 bil-
lion) and even with the broader category of expendi-
tures on External Borders, Migration and Asylum (€33 
billion; table 2 above). In other words, if the EU is to 
play an appropriately large role in fostering financial 
solidarity among member states in the implementa-
tion of more effective asylum and migration policies, 
then funding needs will be substantially higher than 
provided for by the current Commission proposal for 
the next MFF. 
4.3 Monitoring implementation 
of flexible solidarity
33  See European Commission, “Monitoring the Implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights,” Commission Staff Working Document accompanying 
the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, SWD(2018) 
67 final, Brussels (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/staff-working-document-monitoring-implementation-european-pillar-soci-
al-rights-march2018.pdf.
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turing collective efforts.34 Throughout the European 
Semester, there are steps for debating and amending 
policy recommendations at both the EU and member 
state levels, with active involvement by the European 
Council, which ultimately issues country-specific rec-
ommendations. 
One main element for monitoring implementation of 
the EPSR is the Social Scoreboard.35 Built on 94 indica-
tors grouped under three main categories,36 the score-
board enables analysis of trends over time as well as 
cross-country differences, providing evidence on exist-
ing gaps and supporting EU-wide and country-specific 
recommendations. Besides the monitoring of individ-
ual indicators, evidence collected across a scoreboard 
can help identify relationships between indicators and 
contribute to targeted analysis as exemplified by the 
thematic factsheets produced by the Commission.37
The Social Scoreboard developed for the EPSR fol-
lows an approach that is also used in other policy do-
mains. For instance, within the European Semester 
itself, the Alert Mechanism Report identifies member 
states’ macroeconomic imbalances based on evidence 
collected from a scoreboard of 14 indicators, among 
other information. Internationally, scoreboards are 
used for monitoring implementation of the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs), as well as under 
the World Trade Organization’s Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism.
What dimensions to consider?
Similar to the Social Scoreboard under the EPSR, a 
scoreboard for EU flexible solidarity on asylum and 
migration would monitor member states’ efforts and 
contributions vis-à-vis overall EU objectives (Box 1). 
Indicators could be grouped into three main dimen-
sions: 
1. current pressure on EU member states due to asy-
lum applications: number of arrivals, first-time 
applications, and the rate of return of individuals 
ordered to leave;
2. member state contributions to EU policies through 
expanding legal opportunities for migration: re-
settlements, humanitarian visas issued, number 
of first-time residence permits issued to non-EU 
nationals for education and professional purposes; 
burden sharing via intra-EU relocations;
3. member state contributions to funding refugee 
protection: external funds like the EU Trust Fund 
for Africa; EU initiatives like the Border and Coast 
Guard, including by providing personnel; support 
for the integration of refugees in other member 
states or non-EU countries.
Ideally, member states would not contribute exclusively 
to one specific dimension (or even worse, to only a spe-
cific indicator of a dimension) as such cherry-picking 
would make it less likely that, between them, member 
states cover all relevant dimensions of asylum and 
 migration policy. Helpfully, the set-up of the European 
Semester allows for several rounds of consultations 
and provides multiple opportunities to bring to bear 
moral suasion and peer pressure on any member state 
whose contributions fall unreasonably short of what is 
needed.
34  See European Commission, “Monitoring the Implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights,” SWD (2018) 67 final (2018).
35  For details, see https://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/social-scoreboard/#about.
36  The indicators include equal opportunities and access to the labor market, dynamic labor markets and fair working conditions, and public support/social 
protection and inclusion.
37  For details, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-preventi-
on-correction/european-semester/thematic-factsheets_en.
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T
he heat map in table B1.1 is proposed as an example 
of a stylized scoreboard. It reports indicators related 
to dimensions 1 and 2 in the main text, with mem-
ber states’ positions relative to the EU average: The scale ap-
plies six intervals with a 50-point range up to values with-
in 150 percent of the EU average, and then progressively 
increases the range to capture outliers on the right-hand 
side of the distribution. For a meaningful comparison, the 
values have been scaled to per capita terms. 
The indicators displayed in the heat map have been 
grouped according to the main policy areas: asylum, irreg-
ular migration, regular pathways. Across these dimensions, 
the heat map immediately identifies member states that 
are subject to disproportionate pressure vs. those that are 
positioned consistently below the EU average and presum-
ably could increase their contributions in solidarity with 
other member states. At the same time, a low value rela-
tive to the EU average (e.g., below 50 percent) might also 
capture a limited capacity to carry out a specific task (e.g., 
processing asylum applications and enforcing returns). In 
other words, the heat map might in this case identify task- 
specific inefficiencies rather than a lack of political will to 
contribute to European policies. 
The scoreboard also has a time dimension (in our exam-
ple, 2017 vs. 2013) that would naturally evolve into a useful 
tracking device if the monitoring exercise were conducted 
annually. The system of indicators also lends itself to being 
extended to quarterly or monthly data, allowing the infor-
mation to be used as a basis for short-term policy adjust-
ments or interventions. 
This is just a stylized example and a complete scoreboard 
should have a more comprehensive set of indicators that 
includes member state contributions to refugee protection 
world-wide (dimension 3). However, even this small ex-
ample is informative. Countries like Greece, Sweden, and 
Germany have been disproportionally exposed to inflows 
of asylum seekers (i.e., first-time applications and first 
instance decisions). By contrast, member states diverge 
rather less on the acceptance rate for asylum applications, 
with only Italy and Sweden going above 150 percent of the 
EU average in 2013. For other indicators, the distribution 
of member states is skewed, such as for resettlement, for 
which Sweden is a positive outlier. A low return rate com-
bined with a high number of orders to leave (e.g., France 
and Italy) points to possible difficulties in carrying out 
mandatory returns.
Box 1 An example scoreboard for EU flexible solidarity on asylum and migration
Table B1.1 Stylized scoreboard for EU flexible solidarity in asylum and migration



















 AT  DE  EL  ES  FR  HU  IT  PL  SE
 2013  2017  2013  2017  2013  2017  2013  2017  2013  2017  2013  2017  2013  2017  2013  2017  2013  2017
0–50 %  51–100 %  101–150 %  151–250 %  251–500 %  > 500 %
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat—Asylum and Migration [migr].
Note: AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; DE = Germany; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FR = France; HU = Hungary; IT = Italy; PL = Poland; and SE = Sweden.
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n this Assessment Report, we have explained how 
the new European Commission and the EU member 
states can work with migrants’ countries of origin 
and transit to manage the external EU border more ef-
fectively and reduce irregular immigration while cre-
ating more regular employment opportunities in Eu-
rope for non-EU citizens. More and better-managed 
immigration can benefit all stakeholders and help to 
maintain public support for policies under which the 
EU and its member states contribute adequately to ref-
ugee protection world-wide and manage immigration 
in line with their capacity to provide for the social and 
economic integration of immigrants. The following 
key points can inform conversations with stakehold-
ers in Europe and in countries of origin. From these 
discussions and negotiations, a comprehensive strate-
gy can emerge that is ‘owned’ and implemented by all 
stakeholders. 
First of all, most voters tend to support the presence 
of immigrants in their countries, the hosting of ref-
ugees under certain conditions, and certain forms of 
financial support for poor countries that host refugees. 
At the same time, voters want their governments to ex-
ercise greater control over immigration and processes 
related to asylum and refugee protection. 
Second, control over immigration is also key to safe-
guarding the integrity of EU visa and asylum policies. 
Most immediately, this includes keeping in check un-
authorized entry into EU territory at official border 
crossing points or by boat. Furthermore, it is crucial 
that immigrants who have no right to remain in the 
EU (because they have entered irregularly or over-
stayed their visa) can be returned and are readmitted 
by their countries of origin. 
Third, effective and humane border management 
along with return and readmission require close coop-
eration with countries of origin and transit. However, 
such cooperation often runs against the economic 
and political interests of these countries: for example, 
when countries of origin help to curb irregular migra-
tion by their citizens to the EU, they deprive them-
selves of potential migrant remittances; in addition, 
migrants’ families lose the money that they invested in 
emigration. Similarly, when low- and middle-income 
countries prevent refugees from moving on irregularly 
to the EU (e.g., Syrians seeking to move from Turkey 
to the EU), the primary host countries remain respon-
sible for hosting these refugees and for the associated 
fiscal costs. 
Therefore, fourth, cooperation between the EU and 
countries of origin and transit cannot be limited to 
border management and return and readmission. 
Rather, agreements need to package a wide range of 
policies to ensure that the agreements benefit all par-
ties consistently over time, rendering them ‘self-en-
forcing’ (i.e., each party would hurt itself by not ful-
filling its obligations under the agreement). In many 
instances, agreements may be not be international 
treaties, but rather declarations by the parties involved 
(like the EU-Turkey ‘agreement’), setting out policies 
that they commit to pursue. The EU, member states, 
and partner countries would be party to such informal 
agreements to the extent that they are responsible for 
the policies covered. 
Specifically, to render cooperation in border man-
agement and return and readmission attractive for 
countries of origin and transit, we have argued that 
the EU needs to strengthen its ongoing efforts in two 
important areas. In the field of refugee protection in 
low- and middle-income countries, more financial 
support for refugees and more humanitarian and de-
velopment cooperation with host countries would help 
to share responsibility for these refugees more fairly 
and effectively. The economic and social integration 
of refugees in their host economies and investment in 
public services and infrastructure to ensure that resi-
dents and refugees do not compete for scarce resources 
are areas of particular concern. 
Regarding labor migration, we have argued that 
many countries of origin will only support curbing 
irregular migration to the EU if EU member states 
offer substantial opportunities for regular migration 
and employment in Europe. Such offers may usefully 
be coordinated and supported by the European Union. 
Legal migration opportunities would not be driven 
only by labor demand in EU member states, but also 
by the political need to find employment opportuni-
ties for country-of-origin citizens where they can sup-
port themselves, rather than depend on the welfare 
state. Development cooperation in the form of skill 
partnerships may sustain growth in legal migration 
opportunities in the long run.
Finally, overcoming the current impasse in the re-
form of the European asylum system will require a 
new approach to cooperation among member states. 
Refugee protection is a public good at the European 
level in important respects and joint action by member 
states is required to address it adequately. Still, mem-
ber states differ substantially in their living standards, 
how they are affected by irregular immigration, and 
in their capacity and willingness to receive asylum 
seekers and host recognized refugees. Thus, we sug-
gest that the common asylum policy should be based 
on ‘flexible solidarity’ among member states: member 
5 Conclusions
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states would contribute to border management and 
the hosting of refugees in line with their capacities 
and political preferences, while the joint financing of 
asylum policies through the EU budget and the peer 
review of member state contributions would ensure 
that responsibility is shared fairly.
With a more flexible approach, the ongoing revisions 
of seven legal texts that together codify the European 
asylum system would no longer have to be treated as a 
single undertaking; uncontroversial files could move 
ahead, while other files might be reconsidered in the 
light of flexible solidarity. In particular, long-stand-
ing (but never agreed-upon) proposals for a manda-
tory relocation of asylum seekers across EU member 
states could be replaced by a voluntary system of as-
sistance to the few small member states that received 
a highly disproportionate number of asylum seekers. 
In the cases of Malta and Cyprus, voluntary relocation 
to other EU member states should be feasible because 
there are only relatively few asylum seekers involved. 
By contrast, assistance to the Greek authorities could 
usefully focus on fully implementing the agreement 
with Turkey to return those asylum seekers from the 
Greek islands to Turkey who were already protected 
there. 
Solidarity among EU member states will be 
strengthened to the extent that funding for asylum 
and  migration-related policies in the 2021 to 2027 
Multiannual Financial Framework is increased so 
that a larger slice of the costs of border management 
and refugee protection is shared among EU member 
states, rather than borne by the member state that im-
plements a particular action. A peer review of member 
states’ contributions to refugee protection can serve as 
a basis for sharing responsibility among member states 
for the management of the external EU border, the re-
ception of asylum seekers, the hosting of recognized 
refugees, and their social and economic integration. 
Overall, moving toward more effective policies on 
asylum and migration will require extensive consulta-
tions among stakeholders in Europe and in countries 
of origin and transit, and carefully calibrated deci-
sions in several policy areas. The insights in this report 
can help to guide negotiations toward a policy frame-
work for refugee protection and labor migration that 
improves outcomes for all stakeholders.
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Abbreviations
AMF  Asylum and Migration Fund
CEAS  Common European Asylum System
EASO  European Asylum Support Office
EPSR  European Pillar of Social Rights
ESF+  European Social Fund+
ESS  European Social Survey
IOM  International Organization for Migration
MFF  Multiannual Financial Framework
NDICI  Neighbourhood, development, and international cooperation instrument
NGOs  Nongovernmental organizations
SDGs  Sustainable Development Goals
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
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